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1. Preface 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Cuba from both a historical and 
current perspective, and based on these analyses, breakdown the key stakeholders 
and their respective positions towards change.  Due to the complicated nature of 
this topic, there are quite a few things that must be considered before a true 
analysis can be undertaken.  Considering the controversies surrounding the Fidel 
Castro regime, as well as the United States’ policy towards the regime, it is difficult 
to find objective research materials.  Throughout the writing of this paper, a 
conscience effort was made to remove the subjectivity from the various research 
sources, and in essence to consider both sides of the equation.   
Additionally, considering the recent changes within the Castro regime, 
namely the appointment of Raul Castro as the head of Cuba, and the stepping 
down of Fidel, his older brother, there has been much debate whether any true 
changes have been made to both governmental and economic policies.  That being 
said, for the purposes of this paper, the political succession of Raul, is not 
considered to be significant enough to warrant a separate analysis regarding the 
Castro regime.  In other words, for all intents and purposes within this paper the 
Raul Castro regime will be considered the same as the Fidel Castro regime for 
simplicity reasons.  Raul has made only very minor changes, and the few that he 
has made do not really affect the Cuban population in a significant way.   
Raul has now allowed the purchasing of DVDs and computers by the Cuban 
public; however, they are at such a high cost that virtually no one can afford them.  
He has also changed the hotel policies at the State-owned hotels, now allowing the 
average Cuban population to stay in these resorts.  Again, considering the costs of 
such hotels, no average Cuban could even dream of staying at these resorts.  These 
are the basis for the decision to consider the Raul and Fidel regimes as the same 
within the analyses of this paper.   
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Although there well be a brief section regarding some of Raul's changes,  it 
will not be carried through to the full analysis of the Cuban public sentiments.  
Furthermore, it is the opinion of this paper that in order for a true transition to take 
place within Cuba, both Fidel and Raul must be gone.  It will be interesting to see 
what happens following their departure, and whether the hypotheses of this paper 
are correct and a democratic Cuba will arise. 
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2. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Cuba from both a historical and 
current perspective in order to gain insight into whether Cuba is ready for 
governmental and economic changes.  Within this, it is also the goal to examine 
how these specific perspectives influence Cuban public sentiment towards 
transition, and in what political direction the population is most likely to favor. 
In order to understand and address these topics, several questions must be asked:   
 What constitutes the political, economic, social, and technological environments 
in Cuba? 
 How do these international and domestic factors influence Cuban public 
sentiment towards transition? 
 What are the likely outcomes considering the sentiments of the Cuban people? 
Based on these key questions, the structure of the paper has been arranged in 
such a way that it builds upon itself beginning with the history of Cuba, moving to 
a breakdown of its economic structure, followed by the analysis of the Cuban 
people and their sentiments towards transition, and finally, how these sentiments 
affect potential outcomes of any transition as well as which outcome is the most 
likely to occur.   
Section three covers the history of Cuba from the time of its discovery until 
the Revolution in 1959 when Castro came to power.   The focus was on the United 
States and Spanish struggle over the control of Cuba.  The section also focuses on 
the United States and Cuban relationship over time.  In this section, we show the 
US influence on Cuba before and after it granted Cuba its independence and the 
close economic and political ties between the two countries. 
Section four highlights Fidel Castro's regime and the new Cuban and US 
relations.  We looked at the sanctions imposed by the United States on Cuba, as 
well as discuss the Cuban and Soviet Union relations.  The section highlights how 
Cuba shifted its economic and political dependence from the United States before 
the Revolution to the Soviet bloc countries until 1991.  Further, we discuss the 
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structure of the Cuban government, bringing to light the behavior of the Cuban 
government and later the human rights violations.  Finally, we looked at Cuba's 
international relations, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Section five begins with an overview of the Cuban economy from 1959 until 
now. In this section,  we discuss the different policies and reforms made by Castro's 
regime, the effects of the US embargo on the Cuban economy and the effects of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  In the second part of this section, we evaluate the 
major economic sectors and the performance of the economy. 
Section six outlines the social and technological environments in Cuba.  We 
highlight the high performance of the educational and health sectors as well as the 
poor performance of the telecommunication system and infrastructure. 
Section seven is an introduction to the background information regarding 
the Cuban transition and in particular the key elements and stakeholders.  It 
outlines the make up of Cuba's population and forms ten groups in order to 
analyze the Cuban public sentiment towards change.  It also describes these 
groups’ roles both in Cuba and abroad.    
Section eight expands on these Cuban population groups by analyzing the 
affect of key international events and their affect Cuban public sentiment.  A 
description of each groups’ reactions is given, followed by the overall reaction of 
the whole system.  Section nine is similar to eight in that it too analyzes the Cuban 
population groups reactions towards events, however, in terms of domestic events 
within Cuba.   
Section ten brings these examinations together by describing the transitions 
that might take place based on Cuban and other stakeholder sentiments.  It 
illustrates the four potential methods of change as well as the results of those 
changes.  The four methods are succession, peaceful transition, coup, and finally 
civil war.  These methods of change each have very different outcomes both for the 
people of Cuba but also on its key stakeholders. 
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Section eleven discusses in depth the potential methods of change and their 
out comes.  It concludes with a description of the overall Cuban sentiments towards 
the Castro regime and change.  It summarizes the description of the perceived 
preference of the Cuban population, or democracy.  Based on the research 
conducted this seems to be the most viable and popular result due to not only the 
Cuban people but also the key players or countries that both impact and are 
influenced by Cuba.  
Considering the preference of an open-free market economy, and 
democratically elected government, section twelve outlines several critical areas of 
focus before any transition can be undertaken.  It considers the best interests of the 
Cuban people as well as recommends areas of focus based on these important 
Cuban interests.  In order to obtain assistance, which would undoubtedly be 
needed during any transition phase , section twelve recommends the best ways to 
go about obtaing the funds required to address those areas of needed investment. 
Finally, the conclusion brings everything together to show the relevancy of 
Cuba’s history in determining Cuba's future, and how this history has impacted its 
people.  Furthermore, it specifies the overall preferences of the Cuban people, 
which is democracy. 
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3. Cuba’s Political and Economic History Until 1959 
3.1 Political and Economic Environments Prior to 1902 
Following the discovery by Christopher Columbus in 1492, Cuba was not an 
interesting territory for the Spanish in the 16th and 17th centuries.  At that time, the 
country lacked precious metals and it had few slaves due to the lack of African 
slaves as compared to its neighboring countries; for these reasons it was used as a 
naval base serving as a stopover for the Spanish treasure navy.1 
The Spanish settlers established the raising of cattle, sugarcane, and tobacco 
as Cuba’s primary economic products.  African slaves were imported as the native 
Indian population died out as a result of imported diseases from Europe.  The 
African slaves worked on the ranches and the sugar plantations, which allowed 
Cuba to develop its sugar industry.  By the 18th century, Cuba became a large sugar 
producer and a successful sugar-based economy, with the United States as its main 
export market.2 
In the second half of the 18th century, a series of events resulted in massive 
changes in the Cuban economy.  The economic boom in Cuba was driven during 
the first stage by a short British occupation of Havana in 1762-1763 and towards the 
end of the century by the independence of the US in 1783.3  Those events were a 
major force behind the boom in the economy; the economic changes that occurred 
brought an influx of new technology and capital.  Cuba started to become 
economically less dependent on Spain.  A big part of its trade shifted towards the 
British colonies and the economic ties with the United States grew fast as it started 
to rely more upon the American market after its independence. 
                                               
1 EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2008), p.4 
2 CountryWatch Incorporated (2008), p.7 
3 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/63.html 
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Cuba was the last major Spanish colony to gain independence as the Cubans 
were distracted by the major improvement in their economy, which delayed the 
rebellion against the Spanish rule that was spread across America.  However, the 
rebellion was developing as discontent grew among the population: the slaves and 
the free blacks as well as the wealthy landowners were frustrated with the 
repressive Spanish rule and a crisis in the sugar industry in the 1840s and 1850s 
fuelled a 50 year struggle with Spain.  Cuba’s first war of independence began in 
1868 and  ended ten years later in 1878 with the pact of Zanjón.  However, Spain did 
not grant independence to the Cubans.4  Many rebel leaders did not agree to the 
Zanjón pact.  Although it offered some concessions, it did not fulfill the main goals 
of independence and the abolition of slavery. 
In order to win the support of the blacks, the Spanish abolished slavery in 
1880 (though the decree was not finalized until 1888).  With the decreasing 
influence of the Spanish on the Cuban economy and society, the United States was 
starting to become increasingly more important.  By 1890, 10 percent of the US 
imported goods came from Cuba, which was equivalent to 87 percent of Cuba’s 
exports.  This was mainly due to the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 that eliminated 
import duties on sugar from Cuba and thereby greatly increased the United States’ 
influence in Cuba.5  Many Americans came to Cuba to manage their investments, 
which reached US$50 million in 1896 and were mainly concentrated in the sugar 
industry.  The final push for independence that began in 1895 with Jose Marti.  In 
response, Spain sent a new commander to Cuba, General Veleriando Veyer, to stop 
the new revolutionary movements.  But, the newly appointed general dealt harshly 
with the rebels and the measures he undertook to beat the guerillas turned out to be 
a failure.  This resulted in an increase in the popular revolt, which drove Spain to 
make a promise of autonomy to Cuba late in 1897.  The tense relations between 
Spain and the US as well as the USS Maine accident, which sank in the Havana 
                                               
4 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/63.html 
5 US Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (November 2007), p.3 
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Harbor in 1898, caused a US intervention in the final stage of the war.  Late that 
year, Spain ceded its control over Cuba to the United States under the Treaty of 
Paris that was negotiated between the United States and Spain with no Cuban 
representation.6 
What was thought as a US intervention to help the Cubans in their war of 
liberation turned out to be a US war of conquest,7 and the United States occupied 
Cuba for the first time from 1899 until 1902.  During this time, the US exerted 
substantial influence on the island – politically, economically and culturally. 
The Americans wanted to turn Cuba into an autonomous state so that it 
would bear the costs of the new country.  In doing so, a US military government 
ruled the island and offered Cuban rebel leaders well paid positions to keep the 
Cuban army under its authority.  One of the goals of the Americans was to repair 
the war damage that ravaged Cuba so political stability could be achieved 
preventing any attempt of resistance or rebellion to the occupation.  All the costs 
related to the reforms and changes suggested and created by the Americans to 
improve the Cuban economy and society were assumed by the Cuban treasury; 
even the American army expenses were covered by the Cubans.8 
The United States wanted to absorb Cuba into its economic sphere.  They 
forced the inclusion of ”The Platt Amendment” into the constitution during the first 
elections for a convention despite a significant opposition from the Cubans.9  ”The 
Platt Amendment” was seen as compromising Cuban sovereignty and as an 
attempt by the US to maintain control.  It was initially voted down by the Cuban 
constitutional assembly.  The United States threatened that the military occupation 
would not end unless the Cubans accepted the Amendment as part of the new 
                                               
6 http://www.countriesquest.com/caribbean/cuba/history/united_states_occupation.htm 
7 Longley (2000) 
8 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/63.html 
9 Jeffries (1990) 
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constitution.  The Amendment was finally passed by a one-vote margin.  
Economically, ”The Platt Amendment” allowed favorable trade terms for American 
businessmen in Cuba, and it also limited Cuba from conducting normal foreign 
affairs that could jeopardize the Americans’ economic and political power over the 
island. 
3.2 Political Environment Between 1902 and 1959 
After shaping the relation with Cuba through ”The Platt Amendment,” the 
US agreed to withdraw its army from the island and cede its control to the Cubans 
once a new government was established.  On May 20, 1902, the US granted Cuba its 
independence, although it never treated it as a sovereign country.  Instability and 
rising authoritarianism marked the period after independence: Cuba was ruled by 
figures that obtained or remained in power by force.  The United States kept 
interfering in Cuba’s affairs and made sure that the country was run by pro-
American governments that prioritized the US interests over the Cuban interests.  
The US army reinvaded Cuba on two occasions in 1906 – 1909 and in 1917 – 1921 in 
order to help its allies from revolts against emerging fraudulent systems and 
corruption.10 
In 1901, Tomas Estrada Palma was elected as the first Cuban president, but 
he only took office in 1902 following the United States departure.11  During his 
reign, a second agreement, “the Reciprocity Treaty,” increased the Cuban economic 
dependence on the United States in 1903.  The treaty ensured that the Americans 
got 20 percent of the sugar tariffs from Cuba in return for preferential treatment for  
Cuban sugar imports to the US.12 
                                               
10 EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2008), p.4 
11 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/63.html 
12 Doxey (1980) 
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Estrada’s government was hit by several scandals linked to violence and 
corruption.  In the summer of 1906, the US army reentered Cuba for the first time 
since its independence as the new president called for help as he was unable to 
control the revolt led by the Liberal Party.  In order to decrease national 
consciousness against the foreign presence in the island, the Americans made sure 
that the power was divided between all parties and that corruption became well 
established in the Cuban political structure.  The Liberal’s won the presidency in 
1908 and the US withdrew in 1909.  In 1912 and 1916, it was the Conservatives that 
came back to power through General Menocal.  During his two terms, corruption 
increased and debt amassed to a staggering US$40 million.13  As a result, the 
Liberals rebelled again in 1917 causing the United States to send its troops to Cuba 
for the second time after the independence to quell the disturbance.  The second 
American sojourn into Cuba was characterized by very tight control over the 
country.  Every time violence threatened, the United States intervened harshly to 
restore order. 
Liberal Party representative Alfredo Zayas won the presidency in 1920.  
However, he did not actually begin his rule until the United States’ exit in 1923 as 
the island was governed by General Crowder, a US special representative.14  
During Zayas’ reign, sugar prices crashed affecting the country’s economy due to 
the US domination and lack of agricultural diversity. 
Economic problems revived Cuban nationalism at the end of Zayas’ 
administration.  This led to the election of Gerardo Machado Morales, the Liberal 
Party’s nationalist candidate, as the new Cuban president in 1924.  Machado was 
very popular and he did not face any opposition during the early years of his term.  
He led a reform program for public works, tried to protect small and medium-sized 
sugar companies by controlling sugar prices and imposed high taxes on some crops 
to increase agricultural diversity and discourage monoculture. 
                                               
13 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/63.html 
14 http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=220/8 
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Despite his ambitious economic and social programs, Machado’s 
administration turned out to be oppressive and tyrannical.  He ruled with an iron 
grip: political assassinations of his rivals increased dramatically in the last two 
years of his first term.  He secured his second term in the office by outlawing his 
main rival in 1928.15 
The US became worried as the reforms undertaken by the Machado 
administration did not prevent the deterioration in Cuba’s economic situation. 
Several strikes and rebellion attempts erupted in 1930.  These were led mainly by 
the students who played an important role in Cuban politics.  The Cuban secret 
police dealt harshly with the participants.  Unsuccessful negotiations, mediated by 
the US in 1933, between the opposition, the Student Union on one side and the 
Machado administration on the other side, led to general strikes that paralyzed 
Havana and ultimately Machado’s resignation in August of that same year. 
The provisional government following Machado’s resignation could not stop 
the violence that was widespread throughout the country.  A group of army 
sergeants and the Student Directory managed to take over Cuba in September 1933.  
Although the students were backed by the army, they had no political support as 
they were aiming for radical and genuine reforms.  A well known opponent of 
Machado’s, Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin was chosen the president, and with his 
government, repealed ”The Platt Amendment.”  They introduced an eight-hour 
working day rule for laborers, established a labor department, stopped the 
importation of cheap labor from other Caribbean islands, increased the availability 
of higher education, redistributed lands to agricultural laborers, gave women the 
right to vote and eliminated usury. 
However, the changes by the new regime were not backed by the different 
political parties.  Both the Left and Right Parties were against these reforms for 
different reasons.  The United States also did not recognize the new government in 
                                               
15 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/63.html 
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Cuba given its suspension of loan repayments and the nationalization of two 
American mills.  As the pressure increased on Grau and his government, his allies 
stopped supporting him and many of them withdrew from the government 
coalition.  Grau was forced out of office in January 1934, after army sergeant 
Fulgencio Batista, a former member of Grau’s coalition government and one of the 
major figures, took part in the 1933 overthrow and formed a new government with 
the backing and support of the United States.  Although Batista led Cuba from 1934 
to 1944, he was officially the president from 1940 to 1944 as he ruled through 
puppet presidents during the first six years of his regime.16  Batista was very 
popular among the lower classes of the population as he initiated certain reforms 
and undertook efforts to redistribute the land.  Moreover, he initiated a law that a 
president could not succeed himself.  This led to Grau’s return to the presidency in 
1944 as he defeated Batista’s candidate in the elections.  From 1944 to 1952, violence 
and corruption continued to worsen in the island despite reform attempts.  Batista 
seized power for a second time and returned to the office in a bloodless coup just 
three months prior to the presidential elections, suspending the vote for 
presidential elections and ruling as a dictator.  Many political groups opposed 
Batista’s new regime.  Students and guerilla organizations began plotting Batista’s 
overthrow as they wanted a return to democracy.17 
On July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro, son of a wealthy Spanish farmer in northwest 
Cuba and a follower of Eddie Chibás (a famous populist leader that committed 
suicide on a radio program in 1951 to alert the Cubans to the extent of the political 
corruption in their country), entered the Cuban political arena.  He was against 
Batista’s dictatorship and he was promising a return to constitutional rule and 
democratic elections along with social reforms and an end to corruption.  Hoping to 
spark revolution amongst the Cuban population, with the help of students he 
attacked the Monacada soldiers’ quarters.  However, his unsuccessful coup led to his 
                                               
16 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/63.html 
17 ICON Group International, Inc. (2000), p.75 
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imprisonment.18  Castro became a national hero following his speech “History will 
absolve me” during his trial.19  His popularity increased during his time spent in 
prison and 19 months later he was released as part of a general amnesty.  He flew to 
Mexico where he began to plan new attacks against Batista’s regime.  He met 
Ernesto (Che) Guevara in 1955, at a time when Marxist revolutionary thoughts 
swept across Latin America.  Castro returned to Cuba with Guevara and their 
followers on board the Granma yacht in 1956.  They were betrayed upon reaching 
the port of Santiago de Cuba and most of them were killed.  Castro managed to 
escape and started to recruit a new army.  His struggle with Batista’s forces did not 
stop as he continued his raids in 1957.  Batista faced a major setback in early 1958 as 
the US stopped sending arms to the Cuban government and his army faced heavy 
losses when they attacked Castro’s forces.  The final push began in August 1958 
under the leadership of Castro and Guevara.  Three different armies with the 
cooperation with other rebel groups set out to divide the island in two.  Fulgencio 
Batista was defeated and fled on January 1, 1959, to Miami as Fidel Castro’s “26th of 
July Movement” gained control: The Revolution was in Power!20 
3.3 Economic Environment Between 1902 and 1959 
3.3.1 United States Direct Investments in Cuba 
After it granted Cuba its independence in 1902, the United States penetrated 
the Cuban economy by investing heavily in the sugar industry.  The United States 
direct investment in Cuba increased 5 times from 1902 to 1928.  From the 1930s on, 
the Cubans started to purchase a large number of sugar mills from their foreign 
owners.  This transfer of assets to Cuban ownership was done through regular 
commercial channels and it reflected, at that time, how the island matured on a 
                                               
18 EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2008), p.5 
19 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/63.html 
20 CountryWatch Incorporated (2008), p.7 
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business level.  Hence, the US share in sugar production declined from 62 percent 
in 1935 to 55 percent in 1939 to reach 37 percent in 1958.21  After World War II, Cuba 
was a very attractive market for investments.  The Constitution guaranteed the 
protection for property owners and Cuba enjoyed financial stability.  The cost of 
living remained relatively stable, the peso was at par with the US dollar, and the 
risk of currency devaluation was minor.  These diversified US investments played a 
major role in Cuba’s economic growth and US firms penetrated all the sectors of the 
economy.  In the 1940s, US investors began to get involved in manufacturing, 
infrastructure, oil refining, diversified agriculture, tourism and mineral extractions.  
In 1952, a new agreement with the US replacing the one from 1934 allowed Cuba to 
diversify its exports in new markets in the United States. 
By 1957, US businesses made critical contributions to Cuba’s balance of 
payments.  They accounted for a direct net foreign gain of US$335 million and they 
employed an estimated 160,000 workers and 2,000 supervisory, professional, and 
technical personnel.22  
By 1959, in the center of the Cuban Revolution, the United States was 
dominating the Cuban economy.  It accounted for 65 percent of Cuba’s exports and 
provided around 75 percent of its imports.  The US was paying a premium of 80 
percent above world market prices for sugar imported from Cuba, which helped 
stabilize the economy as 60 percent of the sugar was exported to the US.   Cuba was 
becoming more dependent on trading with the US as the latter had powerful 
control and a considerable share in the structure of the economy: 37 percent of raw 
sugar production, 50 percent of public railways, 66 percent of petroleum refining, 
100 percent of nickel mining, 90 percent of power services and telephone, and 25 
percent of bank deposits were in the hands of US companies.   Cuba became a large 
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supplier of nickel in the world due to the US affiliates’ expansion of their operations 
in this sector.23 
The US direct investments in Cuba brought technical and managerial 
expertise and capital.  Cuban groups and entrepreneurs also benefitted from those 
resources resulting in the courage and know-how to take part in the economic 
activities by buying US owned subsidiaries or starting their own companies in 
sectors where US companies dominated.  This is especially true of the sugar, 
banking and air transportation sectors.  
3.3.2 The State of the Cuban Economy Before the Revolution 
  The World Bank Mission observed that “In the 161 sugar centrales, in the 
excellent highway, in the extensive system of public and private railroads, in the 
harbor installations, in the cities, and their utilities, Cuba has the basis of 
exceptionally fine equipment for modern economic activity and further 
development.”24 
This statement demonstrates that Cuba was one of the most important and 
capitalized nations in Latin America.  Real income per capita was fourth in Latin 
America in 1957, even better than Spain and some other European countries.  Real 
wages were higher than any country in the Western Hemisphere except the US and 
Canada: an eight-hour day wage averaged US$6 and wages ranged from US$4 for 
unskilled workers to US$11 for skilled ones.  By 1958, workers’ remuneration 
accounted for 65 percent of the national income and it was surpassed by only three 
developed countries: the United States, Canada, and Great Britain.25  In the 1950s, 
Cuba started to develop new strategies to reduce the impact of traditional 
agricultural exports on its economy.   Several banks were created during that time 
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to offer credit facilities to encourage new companies and non-traditional exports 
and for public works projects like the construction of water systems, highways and 
tunnels.  Further, new laws offering tax incentives to new firms were ratified in the 
1950s. 
Additionally, the tourist industry played a major role in the evolution of the 
Cuban economy in the 1950s.  Hotel capacity almost doubled in the major cities and 
foreign tourist expenditures increased to US$60 million per year in 1958 as 
compared to US$19 million in 1952. 
New Laws setting incentives for agricultural diversification paid off in the 
1950s.  Agricultural exports gains came from several products other than sugar, 
such as rice, fish and cattle. 
By 1959, Cuba reached a self sufficient level in petroleum refining of 83,000 
barrels per day supplied by US oil affiliates.  Reaching this status was also reflected 
in the increase in various industrial activities as US$600 million was invested in 154 
new and the expansion of existing plants.  This demonstrates that Cuba was 
making significant improvements in reducing its dependency upon the sugar 
industry.26 
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4. Political Environment 
4.1 Political Background 
4.1.1 The Revolution in Power 
At the beginning of his reign, Castro promised social reforms and a return to 
democracatic elections, but instead he used his control over the military to 
consolidate his power.  After gaining power, he considered that elections and 
democracy were not suitable for Cuba as he believed social and economic reforms 
should be done first.27 
In the first four years of his reign, Castro worked on many reforms as he 
achieved multiple goals such as land and income redistribution, and working on 
gaining economic independence (especially from the United States) through 
policies that favored industrial and agricultural diversification. 
Moreover during these first four years, Castro was consolidating his position 
as sole leader of Cuba especially through power centralization.  He used his power 
to suppress and punish his opponents as he restricted freedom of speech, took 
control over Havana University (repressing student movements), eliminated 
elements of the Cuban Labor Unions, and arrested and executed thousands of 
Batista’s supporters and other political rivals publicly: “An estimated 3,200 people 
were executed by this new regime from 1959 to 1962.”28  Castro’s radical actions led 
hundreds of thousands of Cubans to flee the country, especially those associated 
with Batista as well as the business classes. 
In 1970, Castro admitted his failure in the reform programs and he changed 
the structure of the Revolution in Power as he “depersonalized and 
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institutionalized” the government.29  He separated the army from the government.  
Castro created a new committee “the Council of Ministers” that had the executive 
power (he headed this committee), changed the judicial system, and made many 
economic changes introducing a work quota system, material incentives, and wage 
differentiation between jobs.  The restructuring of the Revolution in Power proved 
to be a shrewd move as the reforms led to big changes in productivity and the  GDP 
growth rate from 1971 until 1975. 
4.1.2   The Split with the United States 
The United States initially recognized Castro’s revolution, but as the reforms 
moved the regime leftwards toward socialism, a rupture in the relations between 
the two countries was inevitable.  Castro included the Cuban Popular Socialist 
Party in the new administration and started to establish close relations with the 
USSR as the two countries resumed their diplomatic relations in May 1960.30 
In 1960, the US – Cuban relations deteriorated as the Cuban government 
confiscated and expropriated US properties.  In May that year, US oil refineries in 
Cuba, backed by the US government, refused to obey the Cuban government and 
process crude oil bought from the Soviet Union.  As the Soviet crude oil was less 
expensive than the American, Castro nationalized the American oil refineries in 
June 1960.  The US government responded by withdrawing Cuban sugar quotas.  
This decision drove Cuba into nationalizing the majority of US-owned businesses 
worth around US$1 billion without due compensation.31  These actions between the 
two countries peaked in October 1960 when the US government banned all exports 
to Cuba and broke off diplomatic relations on the 3rd of January 1961.32  Castro’s 
description of the Cuban Revolution as an anti-imperialist movement and the 
                                               
29 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/64.html 
30 http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/64.html 
31 http://www.countriesquest.com/caribbean/cuba/history/united_states_occupation.htm 
32 Rasmussen (2002) 
 24 
declaration of Cuba as a socialist state on April 16, 1961, reduced any hopes of 
resuming normal relations with the US.33 
4.2 United States – Cuban Relations 
The 1960s shaped the relationship between Cuba and the United States for 
the next four and a half decades.  Even though the restrictions and the US embargo 
over Cuba were modified during those years, the United States never accepted 
Castro’s totalitarian regime in Cuba. 
Following the deterioration in the relations between Cuba and the US, the 
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) commenced providing Cuban exile groups 
with arms and military training with the objective of overthrowing Castro’s regime.  
Training camps were set up in Guatemala in the summer of 1960, and in April 1961, 
President Kennedy allowed the forces of Cuban exiles to attack Cuba.  This incident 
was known as the Bay of Pigs invasion.  This confrontation with Castro forces was a 
disaster as the exiled forces were defeated within 72 hours.  The operation was 
poorly planned and was based on the idea that the people would revolt against 
Castro and help the exiled forces once they had landed on Cuban soil.  Castro forces 
captured 1,189 exiled invaders, while 114 others died and 150 were unable to land. 
Even though the Bay of Pigs invasion failed, the CIA, in secret, continued to 
support exiled groups planning to overthrow Castro’s regime.34 
The decline between the two countries’ relationship peaked in 1962 when the 
USSR installed nuclear-equipped missiles in Cuba.35  The Missile Crisis could have 
caused a nuclear war since both Cuba and the Soviet Union considered the missile 
installation as a defensive act whereas it was considered an offensive action by the 
United States.  The US considered that this would allow Cuba increased weapon 
                                               
33 http://www.gwu.edu/~gwcsg/OPS/yang.pdf 
34 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1901platt.html 
35 Franklin (1997) 
 25 
delivery across the Continent.  The US obstructed all ships coming in and out of the 
island in order to put pressure on both the USSR and Cuba.  The crisis was over 
when the USSR agreed to dismantle the missile sites in exchange for the US’ 
agreement to withdraw its weapons from Turkey and guarantee not to invade 
Cuba.36  
In 1963, a new US regulation against Cuba was passed.  This regulation 
banned trading with Cuba through other countries and it also froze all the Cuban 
assets in United States.37  
In the 1970s, efforts were made toward improving the relations between 
Cuba and the United States.   Both countries established diplomatic interest sections 
in each others’ capitals,38 and US affiliates in third countries were allowed to trade 
with Cuba.  Those efforts ended when the United States discovered that Cuba had 
been sending troops to Africa (mainly to Angola and Ethiopia) and that Soviet 
forces were present in Cuba.  But as a number of Cubans tried to seek asylum in the 
US in the late 1970s, diplomatic relations between the two countries started to 
improve slowly and quietly. 
The US – Cuban relations in the 1980s were marked by the Cubans exodus to 
the US, known as the “Mariel boatlift.”39  Castro’s government allowed Cubans that 
wished to leave for the United States to use the port of Mariel, in the North-West 
part of the island, as a departure point.  As a result, 125,000 Cubans emigrated to 
the US.  This mass departure of Cubans was interpreted as Cubans would gladly 
leave their country if they could.  Also, Castro forced people with criminal records 
to leave for the United States.  Coming to office in 1981, the Reagan administration 
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was characterized as working on containing the Cuban influence in America.  Many 
policies that tightened the embargo on Cuba were initiated during that period. 
During the 1990’s, Cuba was heavily affected by the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991.  The Cuban economy was in crisis following the loss of 
financial backing from the Soviet bloc countries40 and it was not until late in the 
decade that the economy improved mainly because of economic reforms, the 
emergence of the tourism industry and a diminishing international isolation.  The 
United States acted rapidly after the fall of the Soviet Union by tightening the 
sanctions on Cuba.  
In 1992, President Bush signs a new act that increased the economic and 
political pressure on Cuba.  The Cuban Democracy Act’s main features were to ban 
US foreign subsidiaries trade with Cuba,41 impose restrictions on ships entering US 
ports after stopping in a Cuban port, and allow the American President to impose 
economic sanctions on any country that provide economic assistance to Cuba.  The 
act also eased the sanctions the United States imposed on food and medicine, where 
donations to non-governmental organizations were allowed. 
In 1993, Cuba allowed financial transactions using US dollars.42  This step 
was made in order to help the amelioration of the economy that was struggling 
after the fall of the Soveit Union as the money sent by Cubans emigrants in the US 
to their families in Cuba was an important support for the economy. 
In 1996, Cuban MIG fighter jets downed two airplanes in international 
airspace and killed everyone onboard.  The two planes belonged to a Cuban 
organization based in Miami called Brothers to the Rescue that assisted Cubans 
trying to reach the United States.  The planes were used by members of the 
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“Concilio Cubano” that regrouped pro-democracy, anti-Castro, and human rights 
activists.43  Later that year after the downing of the two planes, President Clinton 
signed the Helms-Burton Act into law.  This law imposed more punitive measures 
on Cuba and included sanctions, contradicting international laws, against non-US 
companies that offer any financial assistance to Cuba. 
The visit of Pope John Paul II to Cuba in January 1998 exemplified a 
tolerance of the Castro regime regarding the practice of religion.  The Clinton 
administration acknowledged the visit and was positive towards improving the 
relations with Cuba.  He eased up the policies against Cuba and allowed direct 
flights to Cuba from the United States.44 
At the end of the decade, in November 1999, the story of the six-year-old 
Cuban boy that was rescued at sea after his boat sank and his mother and 
stepfather died while trying to enter the United States hit the news headlines in the 
two countries.  The Elian Gonzalez affair was about a custody fight between Elian’s 
biological father in Cuba and the boy’s relatives in the United States.  This incident 
dominated and spotlighted the complicated relations between the two countries, 
but in June 2000, Juan Miguel Gonzalez managed to bring his son back to Cuba as 
the custody dispute was finalized in his favor. For the first time in 41 years, Fidel 
Castro in his statement hailing the return and reunion of the Gonzalez family 
considered that this was a time of truce between the two countries.45 
The year 2001, was characterized by negative and positive happenings that 
affected the relationship between the two countries.  That year the United States 
arrested a top official in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) spying for Cuba.  
This incident was followed by another arrest by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) of two members of a Cuban spy organization in the US.  The new Bush 
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administration in 2001 did not ease up the embargo on Cuba.  But in December 
2001, following the devastating Michelle hurricane that hit Cuba, and for the first 
time since the US embargo, a US ship arrived in Cuba carrying food and medicine.  
This important event was followed by the visit of former US President Jimmy 
Carter to Cuba in May 2002.  President Carter had discussions with Castro upon his 
arrival in Havana and he was allowed to deliver freely a televised speech to the 
Cuban people.  During his stay President Carter discussed ways of bringing the 
two countries closer together, as well as issues regarding democracy and human 
rights.46 
On May 20, 2002, President Bush called on the Cuban government to make 
political and economic reforms starting with fair elections for the National 
Assembly.  The “Initiative for a New Cuba” was overlooked by the Cuban regime 
and the National Assembly’s elections were held in January 2003, where all the 
candidates were approved by the government.  Late that year, the Bush 
administration created the “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.”  This new 
initiative aimed to help Cubans who did not disagree with the President as it was 
based on economic and political reforms that lead to transition towards democracy. 
4.3 Soveiet Union – Cuban relations 
In January 1960, Russia’s deputy premier visit to Cuba resulted in resuming 
the diplomatic relations between the Soviet bloc countries and the island in May of 
that same year.  On April 16, 1961, Fidel Castro declared Cuba a socialist country 
and the regime maintained close relations with the Soviet Union until the 
disintegration of the Soviet bloc countries in 1991.  The Soviet Union provided 
financial backing for Castro’s government in many ways.  One example was when 
it covered Cuba’s trade deficit between 1961 and 1967.  Following the Missile Crisis, 
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the compromise deal between the United States and the Soveit Union in 1962 
assured Cuba that it would not be invaded by the United States.47 
In 1972, Cuba became a member of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA).  Under the CMEA the Soviet trading block and Cuban 
economy became heavily dependent on this new alliance of Soviet bloc countries.  
The Soviet Union provided Cuba not only with financial assistance but also with 
military support.  From 1975 and for more than 15 years, Cuba managed to upgrade 
its military due to massive help and support from the Soviets.48 
Following the perestroika and the downfall of the Soviet bloc countries, Cuba 
lost a major economic and political ally in the Soviet Union.  Some 15,000 Soviet 
military personnel remained in Cuba until 1993 and an estimated US$5.6 billion in 
economic and military assistance was also lost starting in 1991. 
4.4 The Cuban Government 
Cuba is a one-party dominated totalitarian communist regime.49  Prior to 
handing the power to his younger brother Raul, provisionally in 2006 and officially 
in 2008, Fidel Castro was the sole leader of Cuba for more than four and a half 
decades.  He ruled the country following the coup that overthrew Batista in 1959. 
Fidel Castro was the president of the Council of State and Council of Minister.  He 
was the chief of state and head of government as well as the Commander of the 
Armed Forces.  And as the leader of the Communist Party of Cuba, he had absolute 
authority over the National Assembly.  The 609 members of the National Assembly 
and the 31 members of the Council of States have the authority in the Cuban 
system.  The National Assembly amend the constitution and approve the budgets 
but since it meets only twice a year, it is the Council of State that has the legislative 
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power and it is the Council of Ministers, that holds the executive and 
administrative powers.  The National Assembly members are elected every five 
years and it is those members that elect the 31 members of the Council of State. 
The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba or PCC) was 
formed in 1965 when the parties of the Revolution against the Batista regime 
merged together. The PCC has around 800,000 members.  It controls the National 
Assembly, the government and all the economic, political and legal decision-
making positions within Cuba.  The PCC Party Congress elects the Central 
Committee that, in addition to overseeing the activities of the Party, also elects a 
Political Bureau – the decision-making body in the structure of the Party.50 
Raul Castro is now the leader of Cuba, he was given this responsibility on a 
permanent basis in February 2008.  Prior to becoming the Cuban president, Raul 
used to be the second secretary of the PCC, the defense minister and the vice 
president of the Council of States and the Council of Ministers.  His reign thus far 
has been characterized by a less restrictive economic policies and a different style of 
leadership, as he is often criticized as being less charismatic than his brother.  He 
has a more collective approach towards the country’s decision making processes.51 
4.5 Human Rights 
Cuban Law punishes any assembly of more than three people that was not 
authorized. In the Cuban constitution, the rights to form an assembly should not 
threaten or contradict the objectives of the “Socialist State of Cuba.”  On vary rare 
occasions, the church is granted permission to hold outdoor masses for major 
religious celebrations.52 
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State security officers often arrest anti-Castro activists that try to organize 
rallies or commemorations of any sort as they are “exercised against the existence 
and objectives of the Socialist State.”  The Cuban population is not allowed to 
change the government.  The PCC is the only allowed political Party in Cuba and 
while the elections for provincial and municipal assemblies is direct, the candidates 
still have to be approved by the mass organizations controlled by the PCC and the 
government. 
One can be imprisoned up to three years, if one criticizes in any form the 
government and its leaders.  Arbitrary arrests are also an effective weapon that the 
government uses to harass and scare its opponents.  The students and their parents 
are evaluated based on their ideological character.  Reports from teachers to the 
Ministry of Education affect and determine the students’ careers.  
The State has the right to interfere and violate its citizens’ life, even though 
the Constitution provides the right of privacy to the Cuban citizens.  Some mass 
organizations controlled by the government interfere in the private life of Cuban 
citizens in order to “improve loyalty to the Cuban state and government”. 
The Castro regime has never respected the Constitution.  The regime 
imprisoned and persecuted thousands of political opponents.  Any sort of public 
dissent or peaceful demonstration was brought down harshly by killing or arresting 
the participants.  The government rejected a proposal of national referendum on 
economic and political reforms presented under the name of the Valera Project in 
1998.  Some of the activists that were behind this project were arrested for 
disagreeing with Castro’s regime.53 
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4.6 International Relations 
With the help and assistance of the Soviet Union, Cuba used to send military 
aid to third world countries.  Cuban troops were involved in many liberation or 
independence wars across the Africa and Latin America.  At the end of the Cold 
War and with the loss of Soviet economic support, Cuba stopped its financial 
backing to guerilla movements.  It is now involved in civil aid by sending doctors, 
engineers, and agronomists to more than 20 nations and it also offers free education 
for anyone in Cuba.  
Cuban membership of international organizations is subject to those 
organizations that do not allow a US veto.  Cuba and Venezuela signed several 
agreements that resulted in the exchange of mainly Venezuelan crude oil at 
subsidized rates for Cuba sending medical doctors to Venezuela and the removal of 
the tax on imports from Venezuela.54  Cuba and China signed memorandums of 
understanding (MOU) in 2004, worth around US$500 million as China was 
interested in accessing Cuba’s nickel deposits.  The agreements with China and 
Venezuela helped improve the Cuban economy after the loss of the Soviet Union 
backing in 1991. 
The Cuban relationship with the European Union  (EU) was always subject 
to the Human Rights code, as the EU put pressure on Cuba to improve the 
measures the latter takes regarding government opponents.  Spain is the major 
foreign investor in Cuba through joint venture enterprises.  In 2006, more than 12 
percent of Cuba’s imports came from Spain. 
Russia also resumed economic agreements with Cuba.  The visit of the 
Russian prime minister to Cuba in 2006 set new trade agreements between the two 
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countries.  Russia established a line of credit over 10 years for Cuba to purchase 
Russian goods and to finance Cuban energy and infrastructure projects.55 
Cuba is a member of all United Nations agencies including the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and has good relations with the Latin American countries as it 
is a 1995 founder of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and a member of the 
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) since 1999.56 
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5. Economic Environment 
5.1 The Revolution in Power 
The Revolution led by Castro to overthrow Batista’s regime in the 1950s 
caused little destruction and loss of lives and properties.  Castro did not face a lot of 
economic problems at the beginning of his reign as the Cuban infrastructure, in 
terms of communication and transportation, was of a high quality in comparison to 
neighboring countries, excluding the United States.  The majority of the population, 
located in the countryside, demanded from the Revolution better working 
conditions including a pay raise and did not aim for getting owning their own 
lands.   So, the new regime in Cuba in 1959 did not have a lot of confrontations and 
demands from the population.  To the contrary, they enjoyed many advantages and 
a benefited from potential employment opportunities in both the agricultural and 
industrial sectors. 
A redistribution of income raised wages and purchasing power.  Although 
this action was favorable among the population, it eventually led to problems in the 
form of increased demand for consumer goods, and since Cuba was unable to 
import goods because of the Unites States embargo demand for goods was not 
met.57 
Economic disruption was due to happen as the country was moving from 
capitalistic toward socialistic economic policies in a centrally planned system.  The 
fact that the United States imposed an embargo on the island did not help the 
smooth transition of the economy as Cuba began experiencing problems with some 
of its other trading partners as well. 
Agricultural reforms started immediately after the new regime was in 
control.  The state nationalized almost 85 percent of the Cuban farms and were put 
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in either cooperatives under the administration of the Institute of Agrarian Reform 
(INRA) or were redistributed to farmers but in restricted amounts.  Some of the 
agricultural reforms included government’s suggestion of agricultural 
diversification by substituting sugar growing.  This proved to be a failure because 
of the lack of experience in growing other agricultural products.  As such, Castro’s 
administration returned to growing sugar in 1963 with a goal to harvest 10 million 
tons of sugar by 1970.  This goal was not reached due to the diversification strategy 
that was adopted earlier which resulted in the destruction of the best crops as well 
as  the lack of maintenance in and new investment of the sugar mills.58 
Industrial reforms also started shortly after the Revolution.  However, it 
began slowly as the government was counting on an increase in agricultural 
earnings to finance the industrialization.  The conflict with the United States led to 
the nationalization of the US affiliates in Cuba without paying any compensation.  
The industrialization reforms were difficult to achieve especially with the crisis in 
the agricultural sector as the returns were not up to the expectations and laborers 
were removed from some industries to help with the sugar production in favor of 
the “ten million tons” program. 
In 1970, Fidel Castro admitted that the economic reform programs were a 
failure and did not reach the expectations of both the Cuban government and the 
Cuban people.  The changes he made in the structure of the State affected the 
economic behavior of the island.  These changes, such as material incentives for 
workers, the introduction of a work quota system (introduced between 1971 and 
1973 and led to a 20% increase in productivity in 1972), and wage differentiation 
according to the complexity and productivity of the job, led the GDP to an annual 
growth rate of 10 percent from 1971 until 1975, as compared to an increase of 
around 4 percent from 1966 to 1970.  The growth rate in from 1976 to 1980 was back 
to a disappointing rate of 4 percent because of problems with laborers, quality and 
a heavy reliance on sugar production. 
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However, the US embargo imposed on Cuba did not have an overall 
devastating effect that could have led to a breakdown of the Cuban economy.  The 
impact of the embargo varied throughout the years before and after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. 
Many Cuban industries suffered from the sanctions imposed since the 
United States was their major trading partners.  The Cuban government integrated 
the socialist approach and entered an alliance with the Soviet Unio.  By 1962, 
trading with the Soviet bloc countries rose to 78 percent of Cuba’s import and 
export as compared to 10 percent four years earlier. 
Cuba joined the trading block of the Soviet Union in the form of the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1972. This new alliance with the 
socialist countries supplied Cuba with more economic assistance as the Soviet 
Union paid around five times the world price for Cuban sugar and offered Cuba 
crude oil at discounted prices.  The trade with the Soviet Union compensated for 
the economic consequences of the US embargo. 
The US embargo on Cuba during the Cold War did not affect much of the 
economy of the island as the economic dependence on the United States shifted to 
the Soviet Union.  But the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 highlighted the 
fragility of the Cuban economy.  Between 1989 and 1992, Cuba’s budget deficit 
reached one-third of the GDP which dropped 35 percent, and exports fell by 61.3 
percent while imports fell by 73.1 percent. 
The US embargo, after the fall of the Soviet bloc countries, hit the Cuban 
economy hard in several ways.  From the time of its discovery until 1991, the island 
always relied on other countries to enhance its economy.  The sanctions imposed on 
Cuba had both direct and indirect effects on the economy after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.59  The direct effects are related to the Acts and punishments that the 
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American administrations since Eisenhower took against Cuba.  The indirect effects 
of the embargo relates to the policies adopted by the Cuban government and that 
tied the economic status of the island to the Soviet Union. 
To overcome the economic slump, the Cuban government made structural 
reforms by stimulating domestic production, restoring import capacity, stabilizing 
the economy, and better integrating Cuba into the global economy.60  The 
government  allowed foreign direct investment in joint ventures and developed 
tourism facilities in order to secure foreign currencies.  In 1993, Cuba allowed 
financial transactions using the US dollar as the money sent by Cubans emigrants in 
the US to their families in Cuba provided important support for the economy.  In 
1994, services mainly related to tourism and the mining sectors led the growth of 
the Cuban economy.  The Cuban government adopted emergency measures 
following the loss of Soviet assistance.  The state reforms and investments, which 
were planned before the collapse of the CMEA, were all abandoned.  Spending for 
the government administrations and the army was dramatically reduced, and 
electricity and oil costs were also greatly diminished.61 
The transformation to a market economy of the former Soviet countries, 
together with limited liberalizing reforms that occurred in Cuba to contain the 
economic crisis, led to the belief that Cuba was following a similar transition as 
those countries out of its severe recession.  However, this was not true since tight 
control and heavy taxes over private enterprises drove most of them out of their 
respective businesses despite the structural reforms.  In 1997, the new central bank 
of Banco Central de Cuba was set up to monitor the financial systems and conduct 
new monetary policies.  Consumer credit, interest bearing accounts, and 
promissory notes were established.  Those reforms were accompanied by an 
overhaul of all the accounting systems in the state, and by an upgrade in 2001 to the 
status of Ministry of Audit and Control of the state audit commission.  During that 
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same period, Cuba established two currencies: the Cuban Peso (CUP) and the 
Convertible Peso (CUC).  The latter replaced the US dollar and is “used between 
Cuban entities operating in hard currencies.”62  “In April 2005, the Convertible Peso 
was equivalent to US$1.08 and individuals can buy 24 Cuban pesos (CUP) for each 
CUC sold, or sell 25 Cuban pesos for each CUC bought; enterprises, however, must 
exchange CUP and CUC at a 1:1 ratio.”63  
In recent years, the Cuban government improved the relations with 
neighboring Caribbean countries and built strong economic ties with Venezuela 
and China.  Venezuela and China are the most important trade partners to Cuba, 
the former supplies Cuba with crude oil at discounted rates in return for Cuban 
medical services in Venezuela, and the latter invests heavily in the mineral sector, 
imports sugar and exports machinery to Cuba. 
Once again, Cuba is linking its economy with other foreign countries even 
though the dependence on Venezuela and China is not as strong as the dependence 
on the United States before the Revolution and the Soviet Union from the 1960s 
until 1991.  The Cuban economical policies that allow the government to control the 
economy through strategic political alliances with other countries should be put 
into question, and maybe the Cuban economy should stop following socialist 
policies that curb the growth of and otherwise  strong economy. 
5.2  Cuba’s Major Economic Sectors 
The Cuban economy is characterized by sugar, fishing, and other 
agricultural production industries and non-agricultural industries such as mineral 
production and mining and tourism. 
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5.2.1 Agriculture 
Following the discovery of Cuba, the Spanish settlers established the raising 
of cattle, sugarcane, and tobacco as the islands primary economic products.  
Throughout the Cuban economic history, sugar production and sugar prices have 
played a major role in determining the performance of the economy.  The economy 
would stop its growth if sugar production decreases or sugar prices go down, and it 
may grow if sugar production and sugar prices go up. 
Today, the Cuban agricultural sector is divided into two: the sugar industry 
and the non-sugar industry.  The former has its own ministry, the Ministry of Sugar 
while the latter covers food production and fish for domestic use and is under the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
The agricultural sector is of major importance to the Cuban government as it 
employs more than 20 percent of the Cuban labor force, even though it does not 
account for more than 5 percent of the national income.  Due to weak performances 
and the economic crisis after the fall of the Soviet Union, the agricultural sector is 
not as important as it used to be to the Cuban economy, the aggregate level of 
agricultural output in 2007 represents only 68 percent of the 1990 level.64  The 
decline in agricultural performance is mainly due to the sugar sector.  As was 
previously mentioned, before its collapse, the Soviet Union used to buy sugar from 
Cuba at five times the world market price, but this financial backing was lost in 
1991 and the sugar sector in Cuba has been suffering ever since.  The industry is not 
profitable when selling at world market prices as production costs are relatively 
high.  The output from sugar production collapsed in 2007 as it accounted for 1.1 
tonnes and was equivalent to US$89 million in exports (1% of Cuba’s total exports) 
as compared to 8.4 tonnes in 1990 representing 70 percent of Cuba’s total exports 
earnings that year and estimated at US$4.3 billion.  The numbers representing 
Cuba’s sugar production in 2007 may be misleading and undervalued since the wet 
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weather in that year might have affected the production.  In 2006, Cuba’s export 
earnings from sugar production was US$236.7 million.65  Even though, in the 
coming years it is more likely to have similar figures to the ones in 2006 rather the 
ones in 2007, one cannot overlook the fact that the days when Cuba was the world’s 
leading sugar exporter are gone.  
  Most of Cuba’s non-sugar agriculture sector benefited from efforts to 
increase efficiency and output since the 1990’s.  Structural reforms in this sector 
simulated the production, and production in 2007 is even higher than what it was 
before the fall of the Soviet Union.  Non-sugar agricultural production is consumed 
domestically and some basic crops such as rice and wheat are still imported.  
Cuba’s traditional agricultural products such as tobacco, rum and citrus fruit are 
subject to limited foreign investment as they constitute an important part of the 
country’s exports.  Tobacco exports averaged US$200 million annually from 2002 to 
2007 and it accounted for US$250 million in 2007.66 
The fishing sector was heavily hit by the economic crisis of the 1990’s and 
was unable to recover since then.  The fishing catch used to be around 130,000 
tonnes and it fell by 70 percent in the 1990’s and did not increase in 1998 to more 
than the half the value it represented in the late 1980’s.  The export of fish products 
according to the Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas represented US$64.2 million in 
earnings in 2006. 
5.2.2 Mineral Production and Mining 
Cuba’s major mining production is nickel.  It is the world’s sixth largest 
producer of nickel and it produces 10 percent of the global cobalt supply.67  Nickel 
production in Cuba soared in the mid-1990’s and since 2001, the country reached a 
peak of 76,530 tonnes in the production of nickel from three plants.(see Chart 1)  
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Given the high international nickel prices and the price nearly tripled from 2005 to 
2007, a plan to upgrade the plants was established to increase production to 125,000 
tonnes by 2010.  Additionally, a new joint venture was created to increase 
production, by building a new plant that same year.  Nickel exports represented the 
majority of earnings from the Cuban exports in 2007, comprising around 60 percent 
of the earnings for a value of US$2.3 billion and representing a significan increase 
from apporximatley US$400 million in 2002. 
Chart 168 
 
5.2.3 Tourism 
The recovery of the economic crisis in the 1990’s was initially led by tourism 
earnings.  The industry grew to become the most important sector and the top 
earner in the Cuban economy, attracting the largest share of foreign investments in 
that decade.  The average annual growth in tourist arrival in the 1990’s was 18.5 
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percent driving the industry to earn around US$1.7 billion at the end of the decade 
as compared to US$240 million in 1990.  This growth slowed down starting in the 
year 2000 mainly due to the industry’s maturity.   The average annual growth of 
tourist arrival from the year 2000 onwards was 4.5 percent (see Chart 2).  
Chart 269 
 
5.3 Economic Performance 
5.3.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Between 1989 until  1993, and during the Cuban economic crisis, Cuba’s GDP 
declined sharply by 40 percent due to the loss of the Soviet financial backing that 
was estimated to be around US$4 – 5 billion a year.  Due to the reforms made by the 
Castro government, the economy stabilized in the mid-1990’s and increased on 
annual average of 5.1 percent from 1999 to 2001.  This increase in annual GDP 
growth was halt starting in 2002 mainly due to the increase in fuel prices, the 
September 11 attacks in the United States and the natural disasters that hit Cuba; 
GDP growth from 2002 to 2004 averaged 2.4 percent.  High international metal 
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prices, higher investments and strong performance in tourism drove the GDP 
growth to nine percent in 2005 and 12 percent in 2006.70 (see Chart 3) 
Chart 371 
 
By 2006, the service sector contributed mostly to the GDP.  Services with 
tourism as the top earner of this sector constituted around 68 percent of Cuba’s 
GDP.  The industrial sector contributes in 27 percent and the agricultural around 5 
percent.72 
Compared with neighboring countries in 2006, Cuba had the second highest 
Nominal GDP just after Puerto Rico, with a value of US$45 billion.  Whereas GDP 
per Capita is around US$4,000 and it ranks in the last five among its neighboring 
countries (see Chart 4). 
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Those numbers reflect the state of the Cuban economy, where the agriculture 
sector contributes no more than 5 percent in the GDP while employing around 20 
percent of the Cuban labor force.  The Cuban economical policies of tight control 
and employing all the labor force led to lack of productivity and underemployment 
that can be explained by these figures.   
 
Chart 473 
 
5.3.2 Employment Figures 
The State is Cuba’s main employer as it accounts for more than 80 percent of 
total employment.  The State employed around 95 percent of the Cuban labor force 
before the fall the Soviet Union, but with the restructuring of the economy to absorb 
the loss of financial backing from the Soviet Union and with some tight liberalizing 
reforms, the private sector contributed in part to the employment of the labor force.  
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“UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
estimates that open unemployment and underemployment together may have 
totaled 40 percent of the economically active population in the mid-1990’s,” 
whereas the official rates submitted by the Ministry of Employment showed a rise 
of only 8 percent in unemployment during that period.74 
According to figures from Datamonitor, unemployment rates declined from 
4.1 percent in 2001 to 1.9 percent in 2006 (see Chart 5) with the number of 
unemployed reaching 95,000 people. 
Chart 575 
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6. Social and Technological Environment 
6.1 Social Environment 
The Cuban population at the end of 2007 was estimated at around 11.2 
million.76  Seventy percent of the population lives in the cities and urban centers 
and 30 percent in the rural areas.  The three large ethnic groups are the Mulattos 
(Spanish-African mixture) that constitute the majority with 51 percent of the 
population, the European descendents 37 percent and the African descendents 11 
percent.77 
6.1.1 Educational System 
Cuba has the best educational system in Latin America.  Illiteracy has almost 
been wiped out with the population literacy rate reaching 97 percent.  The 
education at all levels is free for all, and primary school is mandatory.  Enrollment 
rates are very high and the population’s average education is ninth-grade.78  The 
government considers education a national priority and the educational budget in 
2007 constituted 14 percent of the country’s GDP.  In the last decade new schools 
and institutions have been added and most of the existing schools were 
modernized and renovated.79 
6.1.2 Health System 
The health system is as good as the systems of industrialized countries.  
Cuba made remarkable efforts in improving the health sector.  The health 
expenditure amounted to 8.5 percent of GDP in 2005.80  Medical tourism is a new 
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type of service that has emerged in Cuba over the past few years.  Tourists head to 
Cuba for medical treatments as the country provides one of the highest quality 
medical-care in the world. 
Health indicators as compared to the US and some of the other neighboring 
countries show impressive numbers for Cuba.  Life expectancy in Cuba for the 
entire population in 2005 was almost 78 years, which is the same as in the US and 
Chile and far better than averages for Guatemala and Haiti.  Infant mortality rate 
are just six deaths per 1000 live births, which is also the same as the United States.  
The maternal mortality rate is still high in Cuba when compared to the US and 
Chile.  The main reasons behind this rate is the shortage of modern equipment and 
medical supplies in the rural areas (see Chart 6). 
Chart 681 
 
6.1.3 The Human Development Index (HDI) 
The human development index (HDI) ranks Cuba in 50th place in the high 
human development category.  This measure of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) combine several indicators that measure a country's 
achievements in three main areas of human development: longevity, education, and 
economic standard of living.82  
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6.2 Technological Environment 
Cuba has one of the least developed telephone systems in the world.   One of 
the largest foreign investments in Cuba to date occurred in 1994 with the formation 
of a telecom joint venture, the Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba SA (Etecsa) 
between the Cuban government and Grupo Domos from Mexico.  Ectecsa 
monopolizes the Cuban market, as it is the only providor of fixed-line and mobile 
services.  According to the UNDP, in 2007 only 10 percent of the Cuban population 
uses fixed-line services.  This number represents only 50 percent the average for 
Latin America and the Caribbean region.83  The rate of mobile phones users is even 
lower and in 2007 that rate was 2 percent.  One of the reasons for the limitations in 
this market is because bills have to be paid in Convertible Pesos. 
Government control is not allowing the technological sector in Cuba to 
develop.  In 2006, the number of personal computers (PCs) was equivalent to only 
about 6 percent of the population.  Given that access to internet is restricted to 
government offices, in 2004 only 1.3 percent of the population used the internet. 
According to the IT Ministry, further expansion in this industry is a priority 
in the future, so that the population will have a broader access to PCs and internet 
use.  However, will the Cuban regime allow access to information provided to its 
people other than the one supplied by the state? 
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7. Introduction to Transitional Elements and Background 
Information 
 Before going into detail on the topic of Cuba’s governmental and economic 
transition, it is important to consider several key elements, and specifically how 
these elements could affect potential transitional outcomes.  These elements 
include: Cuban history, the Cuban economy, multilateral and governmental 
organizations (e.g. IADB, World Bank, IMF, OAS, UN, etc.), and most importantly 
stakeholders84 within and outside of Cuba.  In addition to the previous examination 
and analysis of Cuba’s turbulent history and economic sectors, a look at the 
stakeholders and their influences must be explored, particularly how these 
stakeholders have been, and continue to be influenced by both historical and 
current events.   
 In today’s globalized world, the term stakeholder does not mean what it 
used to; it has grown to encompass much more.  Also, the multilateral 
governmental and non-governmental organizations have ever-increasing scope and 
influence.  This phenomenon known as globalization has an incalculable impact on 
any transition that Cuba would go through.  Globalization as Joseph Stiglitz wrote 
is “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world, which was 
brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and 
communications, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, 
services, capital, knowledge and people across borders.  Globalization has been 
accompanied by the creation of new institutions that have joined with existing ones 
to work across borders.”85 Because of this, the Cuba’s stakeholders have grown to 
include the Cuban  population (within and outside of Cuba), it’s main trading 
partners both currently and historically, the neighboring countries, as well as any 
future or potential countries or industries that will be impacted by a Cuban 
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economic change.  That being said, in order for a stable and sustainable transition to 
occur the majority of stakeholders must achieve some sort of understanding, 
without which there would be chaos.   
 In terms of the largest and most important stakeholder, or the Cuban 
population itself, both currently living in Cuba as well as the dissidents living in the 
United States, a breakdown of groups can be formed ranging from those that fully 
support and even fight for the current establishment in Cuba, to those that despise 
it and fight against it86.  Any changes within Cuba would have to be approved by 
the majority of its citizens (as defined by Cuban born individuals) in order for it to 
work successfully.   
Additionally, the term successfully or successful transition for the purposes 
of this paper has to do with the well being and basic freedoms of the people of 
Cuba.  A more in depth analysis and breakdown describing the actual groups and 
their composition will be discussed in the following sections. 
 Related to these population groups mentioned above, are their influences 
and impacts, or the actual events both foreign and domestic, which are the crucial 
determining factors as to where individuals will be defined within each 
classification group.  In other words, their positioning in society will help to 
determine where they stand on the current establishment in Cuba, and the current 
and historical events will further influence their positioning in society and possibly 
even change it.87  In order to examine this aspect of the key stakeholders a historical 
evaluation must be done, however unlike the previous historical analysis, the 
following one will separate foreign from domestic events and will only focus on 
how these events impacted or changed the Cuban population sentiment towards 
the current government and economic system.   
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 Beyond the main stakeholder of the Cuban people, there are also the external 
stakeholders and even specific industries that would be impacted by a Cuban 
transition.  That being said, it is rather obvious that the United States is a key 
stakeholder that has a significant interest in the transition process and its 
outcome.88  In addition to the United States, Central, South and the remainder of 
North America have a significant stake in the pie so to speak of a potential Cuban 
transition.89  In terms of Europe, Russia has a reason for concern due to the two 
countries previous partnership.  Other important European countries that have an 
interest include the Netherlands, Spain and Italy90.  Outside of the EU and Europe 
for that matter, Japan91 and China92 have considerable business interests in Cuba.  
In terms of actual industries, as mentioned previously in the breakdown of the 
Cuban economy, sugar, fishing, and other agricultural production industries are 
considered to have a stake.   Non-agricultural industries that have a stake are the 
mineral production/mining such as nickel and to some extent petroleum 
production.93  In addition, tourism is another crucial sector within the Cuban 
economy, responsible for roughly 15 percent of total GDP in 2004.94 
 Currently, Cuba’s largest country stakeholders outside of the United States 
include Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, Canada, Russia and China.95  For the 
purposes of the analysis in this paper, the country stakeholders will be categorized 
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into groups, namely, the United States and the group of Latin Countries 
(Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia).  While the remainder of the countries will have 
an impact on a potential transition, these selected few will have the most significant 
impact, based on historical precedents as well as current market trends. 96 
 All the elements required and involved in a Cuban governmental and 
economic transition have diverse impacts and relations to the potential outcomes, 
as seen in previous economic and governmental transitions like the former Soviet 
Union and China for example.97  A deeper look into these particular elements, 
specifically in terms of the Cuban public sentiment, will help to better understand 
how and even why a transition might take place in addition to helping to strategize 
for such a transition. 
7.1 Cuba’s Largest Stakeholders: It’s Population Broken down by Groups 
7.2 Introduction to Population Breakdown 
 Prior to the in-depth analysis of the Cuban population and in particular their 
sentiments towards the current governmental system/establishment, it is important 
to mention that there is a serious lack of information regarding the scope of such 
issues.  Furthermore, the information that is available is difficult to substantiate in 
order to maintain an objective perspective while performing the analysis.  That 
being said, the sources used were from an actual Cuban foreign agent working in 
the United States, who later became the first director and organizer of Radio Marti.  
Although, this might seem to be slightly subjective, it was corroborated with other 
analyses done by other scholars in the field of international relations and political 
science.98   
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 Furthermore, it is also difficult to analyze Cuban public sentiment since the 
current establishment punishes any dissenting views from its “revolutionary” 
principals.99  Since there is a so-called “double moral”100 in Cuba due to repression 
and lack of basic freedoms, namely freedom of speech, these dissenting views are 
kept private and will only come out publicly on rare occasions.  However, such 
occasions do occur, for example the Catholic Pope John Paul II visit in 1998.101 
 With all these difficulties in discerning Cuban public sentiment, it is still 
evident that the population of Cuba can be broken down into groups of people.  
These groups range from those who strongly support the “revolution” and would 
fight to maintain it-all the way to the opposite extreme, or those who would fight to 
rid Cuba of the current establishment.  Basic human nature when combined with 
establishment will always create supporters together with an opposition.  
Moreover, people are not necessarily polar; they can also be in the middle or 
indifferent to the current establishment.  
Similar to Ernesto F. Betancourt’s breakdown/model102 of the Cuban 
population based on their sentiments towards the current Cuban establishment, 
this analysis describes a model to help evaluate Cuban public sentiment towards 
the government.  It includes Cuban dissidents living outside of Cuba (technically 
non-Cuban citizens) as well as “licensed” Cubans living outside Cuba sending 
remittances back home while still working for the “revolution.”103  It arranges the 
population into five groups each with a sub group or ten total groups.   
The chart below describes the Cuban population breakdown.  It shows the 
two distinct groups, or those Cubans that are currently still living inside the 
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country as well as those that have left, either with or without the permission of the 
government.  Some examples, which will be described later, are also given 
regarding the makeup of the particular groups. 
Chart 7 
 
7.2.1 Make Up of Groups A1 and A2 
The composition of group A1 and A2 is relatively straightforward, it 
contains the strong believers/supporters in the “revolution.”  Obviously, this could 
be because of the benefits they are currently receiving from their civic, military, and 
governmental positions.  The main constituents of these groups include all of the 
ministers and higher/highest-level governmental and military officials.  The 
MININT or Ministry of the Interior plays a significant role in all aspects of the 
current Cuban society and establishment.104  Furthermore, the Seguridad Del Estado, 
the National Police force and CDR’s or Committees for the Defense of the Revolution are 
key players in this category.105 The CDR’s have been described as “a nationwide 
network of neighborhood block associations which act as appendages of the Urban 
                                               
104 Institutions and Players: Key Figures report Luis Carlos Nino (2008) 
105 Ibid 
 55 
Cuban State security apparatus” and have been referred to as somewhat of a secret 
“unofficial” police force.106 
Externally, Group A2 can be described as pretty much the same as Group A1 
with the basic difference of current location.  This group is made up of all the 
Cuban governmental officials that are living abroad for State reasons, and even 
including upper level Cuban consulate/embassy staff. 
The A1 and A2 groups are considered virulent supporters of the “revolution” 
and would even resort to violence in order to maintain the current establishment.  
They have good reason for this however.  The majority of these Cubans hold the 
majority of assets within  Cuba, even though in some areas individual ownership is 
not permitted.  They in essence also maintain the leadership position in those 
specific organizations.  In other words, they are the head of some of the SOE’s 
(state-owned enterprises) and as such enjoy many financial benefits as long as they 
stay in favor with the bureaucrats in power.107 
7.2.2 Make Up of Groups B1 and B2 
The composition of Groups B1 and B2 is somewhat similar to A1 and A2, 
including some of the same members, however they are less staunch in their 
support of the regime.  These groups would be much less likely to engage in 
violence in order to maintain the current establishment, which is not to say that 
they might eventually migrate upwards into the A1 or A2 categories.  The lower 
levels within the MININT would most likely be in this category, along with the 
lower level military and police officials.  
The stronger believing communist youth would be a large part of this group 
along with the ANAP, and CTC members.  The ANAP or the Asociación Nacional de 
Agricultores Pequeños, which means the National Association of Small Agriculture, 
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are strong supporters of the current government.108  They have good reason to be 
supporters as they benefit from the current economic structure in that they have a 
virtually guaranteed farm under their management as long as they stay in favor 
with the governmental officials.  The ANAP also do not recognize the property 
claims from the previous families living and farming the land prior to the 
“revolution.”  This is a very good reason to support the current system, without 
which they might lose these farms.  
The CTC, or Central de Trabajadores Cubanos, also are strong believers of the 
current system.  They represent the only legal workers union so to speak in Cuba.  
Some consider the CTC more of an extension of government oversight into the 
factories to discourage dissent and to ensure proper work is being done.109  They 
also enjoy particular benefits from being strong party members.  They could even 
be considered self-seekers, because of the way they do not ardently support the 
system but rather support it for self-gain.110  
The Cubans in the B2 Group, or Cuban nationals legally (with permission of 
the Cuban government) living outside of Cuba also have a good reason to support 
the system as they are likely to be working for Cuban government interests outside 
of Cuba.  They could also be members of the ministries, but are more likely to be 
employees of certain SOE’s (State-Owned Enterprises).  Other potential members of 
this group are the Cubans that live outside of Cuba with permission, who are 
similar to dissidents, just without the legality issues, along with this license they 
normally pay certain fees associated with supporting the party at home, thereby 
keeping them in good standing order with the current Cuban government.111 
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The B1 and B2 Groups could be considered opportunists112 in that they are 
simply supporting the system as much as they need to in order to benefit from a 
better quality of life or higher position within the SOE’s.  This is of course not the 
case for all people within this category.  Some truly believe in the system, but 
would not be willing to fight physically for it, instead opting for other non-violent 
approaches. 
7.2.3 Make Up of Groups C1 and C2 
Group C1 and C2 are quite a complicated group.  This group contains the 
majority share of the population when compared to the other groups.  The 
members of this group have an indifferent attitude towards the current regime, and 
are considered to be more focused on survival and making a living instead of 
politics and government.  It is also the group that has grown the most over the 
years.113  This group would most likely pursue a more passive role in any 
transition, however, that does not mean that they would not change groups if they 
thought it might benefit them in some way.   
This group or C1 contains a fusion of different people, from those that feel 
disenfranchised with the Cuban revolution, to those that opposed the establishment 
but gave up for one reason or another trying to fight for change.  Furthermore, due 
to the significant poverty in Cuba, a large portion of the group are people who are 
just trying to get by, or earn what meager living they can given the resources they 
have.  Basically by keeping survival at the forefront some might even say that 
politics is a luxury they cannot afford.  It is important to note however, that these 
people are not willing to try to escape or leave Cuba, so they therefore still must 
have some feelings of nationalism or pride.  Alternatively, it could just be fear of 
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punishment for dissenting.114  This group would not contain any governmental or 
military officials, and would be made up primarily of common citizens.   
The C2 group is much different from C1 in that it contains the Cubans that 
have already left Cuba, and now live abroad as dissidents.  C2 might also contain a 
small number of Cubans that have legally left to live and work abroad, but this 
would be insignificant when compared to the rest of the group.  C2 Cubans are the 
ones that have virtually given up and no longer associate themselves with any 
movement or cause for change.  Due to the complicated circumstances, they might 
even assume the nationalities of their new host countries, and never look back.  
Betancourt notes that these types of Cubans, who have become indifferent to 
transition, would most likely support the idea of annexation (to the United 
States).115 
7.2.4 Make Up of Groups D1 and D2 
The population segment that makes up Groups D1 and D2 are those that 
resist, and rebel against the current Cuban establishment.  They are strong 
supporters of a governmental and economic transition.  This is reflected in their 
day-to-day behaviors and even in some cases employment.  Some of the members 
of this group might have migrated downward from C1/C2 and even B1/B2, as they 
might realize significant benefits for their labor by owning their own small business 
or by working with cooperatives in the agricultural sectors of the economy. 
D1 is most likely to consist of the VITRAL supporters/members and readers.  
VITRAL is a Cuban socio-cultural catholic magazine. A space for transparency and 
reflection in the pluralism and multicolor light the Civic and Religious Education 
Center offers, in the Pinar del Rio Diocese.”116  This group actually stands up against 
the “repression and injustice” within Cuba through a combination of civil 
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disobedience and even protests. 117  The members of this group face persecution, 
penalties/prosecution and even jail time for being against to Fidel’s revolution. 
Furthermore, due to their unwillingness to work within the current system, 
they suffer financially.  They are not members of the CTC,118 and are thereby less 
likely to be able to enjoy what little benefits exist for small business operators.119  
This group uses non-violent measures to cause change within the current 
establishment, sometimes even at the cost of their own detention.120  Another 
important factor associated with these Cubans is related to the fact that the majority 
have relatives living outside of Cuba.  This has two major consequences, one is the 
fact that their family members most likely defected, which means they are not in 
support of the current regime; and two and perhaps the more influential 
consequence is the fact that these Cubans are the ones receiving the majority of 
remittances coming into Cuba.  This not only affects their personal income/wealth 
but also gives them the ability to be more independent from the system and from 
other socio-economic conditions.121 
The D2 group on the other hand is a strong supporter of a Cuban transition 
within and outside of the United States.  They are some of the ones who have 
helped to sponsor such lobbying power to help maintain the embargo against 
Cuba.  Some of these people are members of organizations like the CANF or Cuban 
American National Foundation.122  As mentioned earlier, the majority of Cuban 
dissidents living in the United States belong to this group.  The remittances that 
were touched upon previously are primarily sent from the group to their relatives 
and even friends who remain in Cuba.  This group is the stronger than D1 in terms 
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of their support for change.  They are the ones that risked their freedom, and even 
lives in some cases to escape to the United States.  This group is expected to play a 
significant role in any Cuban transition. 
7.2.5 Make Up of Groups E1 and E2 
Like Group A1 and A2, Group E1 and E2 are the most radical of the 
opposition and are the most active supporters of change in and outside of Cuba.  
The population in this group would potentially use violence in order to achieve 
their goal of a democratic Cuba as these people openly participate in acts of 
defiance towards the government.  Even in the face of government oppression, this 
group continues to fight for its cause. 
Cubans in Group E1 are the most extreme.  The majority of these Cubans are 
serving time in prison or have served time previously, and they continue to openly 
criticize the regime within its own borders, even resorting to some acts of violence.  
They are often members of the MLC or Movimiento Libertario Cubano, which is a 
“network of Cuban anarchists living in exile abroad and possibly in Cuba, 
including collectives and individuals.  The organization(s) take a consistent anti-
capitalist and anti-Castro position denouncing both Fidel Castro’s regime and the 
U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba while encouraging anarchist/libertarian 
communist/libertarian socialist resistance in both countries and abroad.”123  It is 
important to note however that not all people in E1 are part of this radical group.  
Some participate in another group, the CLM or Cuban Liberal Movement who 
“support the Christian democratic party of Cuba.”124  These people were also the 
ones “willing to sign/join the Proyecto Varela petition/movement” which landed 
many in prison.125  This movement will be discussed in later chapters. 
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The Group E2 is similar to Group E1 but is perhaps less extreme.  Both the 
members of the MLC and the CLM also make up this group.  Additionally, a 
significant portion of these Cubans living in exile have been imprisoned in Cuba, 
justifying their escape.126  Like the D Group, this group would be essential to any 
transformations.  Moreover, they would undoubtedly return to Cuba to help with 
this complicated and long-term process.  Some more radical members of CANF 
would also be a part of this group as they are the real substance behind a lot of the 
United States government policy towards Cuba.  Through their lobbying power in 
combination with their importance in terms of voter population in the state of 
Florida, which is a swing state for presidential and other national elections.  In fact, 
in terms of the Helms Burton bill,127 which will be discussed later on, former 
President Clinton was basically forced to sign a bill in which he was not in favor.  
“Most of the Clinton administration was actually against the Act.  Some Clinton 
aides have claimed that Clinton was persuaded to endorse the bill by his National 
Security Advisor who …convinced him that he needed the political cover in 
Florida.”128 
7.3 Size of the Population in Each Group 
Obviously, there are differences in the sizes of all ten groups.  In addition, it 
would be uncharacteristic that the extremes groups, A and E be larger than the 
middle groups B, C, and D.  Based on research, the population breakdown of all the 
groups is similar to a bell curve with the one exception that the bottom groups or D 
and E are larger than the A and B group who still support the regime, this 
breakdown can be clearly seen on the Chart 7.  Considering the trends in exodus 
numbers it would seem that more and more Cubans are defecting,129 However, 
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rather than staying in Cuba to resist, they simply make the perilous journey to the 
United States or Mexico.130 
It is also important to note that though research suggests that there are more 
Cubans opposed to the current regime, it is impossible to truly tell whether or not 
that is valid.  Considering the bias in journalism, especially in the United States 
regarding Cuba, research is difficult to substantiate.  Also, in terms of the figures 
coming out of Cuba, there is absolutely no way to substantiate the government’s 
data.   
                                               
130 Ibid 
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8. Affects of Foreign/International Events on the Population 
Groups 
The next step in this process of analyzing Cuban sentiment and its influences 
on a potential governmental and economic transition is to examine the foreign 
events that have directly affected Cuba and how the different Cuban population 
groups perceived them.  By doing this, a picture will begin to emerge of the 
disposition of the Cuban population in terms of a shift of power, or actual transition 
and change.  The chart below depicts the affects of these selected foreign events on 
the ten different population groups.  An analysis of the affects on the groups 
follows. 
Chart 8 
 
8.1.1 The Collapse of the Soviet Union 
On December 3rd 1991, the Soviet Union officially collapsed, as all Soviet 
institutional operations were terminated.131  This end of a communist empire was 
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not only a disaster for Cuba’s economy, which was virtually dependent on the 
support of and trade with the Soviet Union, but also detrimental in terms of the 
support of communist ideology.  As previously discussed, Cuba suffered 
tremendous economic woes, which caused significant hardship to the entire Cuban 
population, with few exceptions.  All the population groups were strongly affected 
by this resulting depression. 
In terms of the population Groups A1 and A2, they were the least impacted 
by the financial/economic hardships.  However, this group was severely shaken by 
the fall of such a huge regime/empire, which undoubtedly led them to question 
their own destiny under this system of government.  Moreover, without the 
financial benefits of the sugar trade and supply of petroleum below market value, 
they were left to discover new means of trade and energy resources.  Worse yet was 
the fact that their ideology had proven to be a failure, and the whole world knew it, 
including the Cubans themselves.132  Groups A1 and A2 were shaken by this 
foreign event leading them to implement economic reforms. 
Groups B1 and B2 also suffered similar shocks in terms of their confidence in 
the government as well as their ability to provide considering the deep depression 
Cuba was facing.  Any Cubans in Group B1 that were not fundamentalists or strong 
believers most likely shifted their views towards Group C or indifference.  The B 
members that were there for self-promotion and personal gain must have 
reevaluated their belief systems as well as the political strategy. 
The indifferent Group or C1 suffered the worst in terms of 
financial/economic woes, but the least in terms of their beliefs in the communist 
system.  Obviously, Group C2 did not personally feel the pains of depression, but 
family members and friends that were still in Cuba did, causing their view of 
indifference to migrate more towards opposition and Group D.  Group C1’s views 
were even more impacted, experiencing the result of a depression first hand causes 
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a significant change in beliefs, and even in terms of the risks, they are willing to 
take in order to escape or improve their quality of life.  This is evident by the Cuban 
mass exodus taking place of Cubans into Florida, which resulted in an agreement to 
be formed between the United States and Cuba to return all dissidents.133   
Considering the oppositional beliefs held by Groups D1/D2 and E1/E2, the 
fall of the Soviet Union only strengthened their position of change.  The economic 
woes however, were most destructive in these groups (excluding D2 and E2) as the 
Cubans suffered enormously at the hands of the state.  In response to this collapse, 
Groups D2 and E2 pushed the United States government into funding a freedom 
television station known as TV Marti.134  As illustrated by the chart eight above, the 
fall of the Soviet Union positively impacted Groups E, D, and C, intensifying their 
support and receptivity of a transition or change. 
8.1.2 The Rise of China 
Even though Chinese communist values and economic policies differ from 
Cuba’s, their successes are an undeniable testament supporting the communist 
system.135  This foreign event significantly counteracted the Soviet fall, just as 
communism had failed the Soviet Union, granted somewhat of a different flavor it 
had blossomed in China.  This event helped reinforce/sustain many beliefs in the 
Cuban population.  Additionally, China provided another ally/trading partner 
which helps to boost the Cuban economy.136 
In this case, Group A1 and A2 are to some extent supported in their beliefs 
by China’s successful example, however considering the substantial differences in 
their economic and governmental policies this benefit was to some extent 
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counterbalanced.137  Groups B1 and B2 were also positively supported, but 
considering their broader beliefs are not harmed by the differences between Cuba 
and China.  Furthermore, the addition of a new extremely powerful trading partner 
and resulting boost in the economy also helps them increase their own yields.  The 
B1 and B2 group are the ones to reap the most rewards regarding China’s rise to an 
economic power. 
Cuban population Group C1 also benefits from the added trade with China.  
However, unlike the previous groups, they are not concerned with the differences 
in politics, resulting in no real change in their views towards transition.  The C2 
group also benefits in that their families and friends still in Cuba are slightly better 
off with the new earnings from trade.  Similarly, even the D Groups experience 
these benefits from trade, but with the cost of some weakening in their position of 
opposition towards the regime.   
The E Groups are the only members that do not really enjoy any of the 
benefits from China’s growth.  Not only are they excluded from the added income 
due to their opposition status, they too are also somewhat weakened in their 
argument for change.  The growth of China is not quite as significant an event as 
the fall of the Soviet Union, but it does prove not only to the people of Cuba but 
also to their adversaries, that a form of communism does work and can achieve 
considerable economic growth. 
8.1.3 Globalization, WTO, and Neoliberalism  
As mentioned earlier, the global economy is changing, borders and trade 
barriers are diminishing, market liberalization is spreading138, and with these 
changes come the concepts of “freedom and democracy” which have become “the 
basis for organizing modern political rule.”139  Not all of these changes are a part of 
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the Cuban regimes ideology, namely the idea of globalization, and of course 
democracy.  Globalization is due to a large extent to capitalistic markets, the quest 
for the almighty dollar has driven businesses and industries to migrate to other 
cheaper more efficient global markets.  This fact is completely counter to what 
Cuban economic and governmental policies have at their roots, or 
communism/socialism, this topic will be discussed later.  Additionally, the 
formation of a group, the WTO or World Trade Organization, whose purpose is to 
regulate global trade, which globalization has brought about only reinforces the fact 
that globalization and neoliberalism is a much more successful system in terms of 
increased Gross Domestic Product, or GDP. 
Because of these differences in ideology, the upper level members of Cuban 
establishment are negatively impacted by this market/global trend.  Considering 
the fundamentalist views held by Groups A1 and A2 regarding communism, 
globalization and neoliberalism significantly degrade their views.  Even with the 
increase in the import/export markets within Cuba, the groups are so vested in the 
current regimes organization and philosophy that they are unable to benefit from 
trade.  Groups B1 and B2 share this inability to benefit from globalization, and even 
if they were to accept the new policies and added earnings from trade they would 
undoubtedly be punished for showing their support by the other members of the 
group and higher authorities within the party. 
Groups C1 and C2 on the other hand are able to benefit from the extra 
income from trade, and because of their indifference, and low party status they are 
unharmed by the discrepancy in principles.  Additionally, the mounting evidence 
that globalization and neoliberalism is more viable pushes the C1 and C2 Groups 
towards support of transition and change.  Like the previous group, D1 and D2 also 
benefit from the added income from trade.  Moreover, the differences in the 
ideology between communism and globalization with neoliberalism support what 
they have been fighting for all along.  This foreign event/phenomenon is the proof 
and basic rational behind their quests for change. 
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Groups E1 and E2 on the other hand have a more anarchist view towards 
current economic and governmental systems.  They take a “consistent anti-capitalist 
and anti-Castro position.”140  Since the population make up of the E1 Group are the 
most radical opponents of the system within Cuba, they do not benefit from any 
added trade, since they are constantly detained and monitored for “so-called illegal 
activity” by the Cuban government.141  Only a few of the population in Group E2 
benefit from the new ideology, namely the CANF members. 
8.1.4 The Helms-Burton Act 
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act also known as the Helms-
Burton Act was ratified by President Bill Clinton in March 1996.  This act “enforces 
penalties on foreign companies conducting business in Cuba, it also permits United 
States citizens to sue foreign investors who use property that the Cuban 
government took from America, and denies them entrance into the United 
States.”142  This bill was lobbied by the CANF, and was obviously created to do 
even more damage to the Cuban economy when combined with the embargo, 
which was previously discussed.   
Neither Groups A1 and A2 or B1 and B2 benefit from this event.  Not only 
does it limit the foreign businesses that interact and trade with Cuba, but it also 
allows the United States to directly support opponents to the Castro regime within 
Cuba itself.143  In essence, this new bill is an extension of the embargo that already 
exists between the United States and Cuba; it is a significant tightening of the 
screws.  This bill also harms the C1 Group in that they too lose valuable resources 
from trading partners lost.  This loss is significantly offset by the allowances of 
remittances from the United States to Cuba, the additional income, and dollars no 
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less are a huge benefit for the population.144  The C2 Group also benefits in that it is 
able to visit and send money to family members in Cuba, which was severely 
limited previously.145 
The D1 and D2 Groups were again able to benefit the most from the passing 
of this new bill.  D2 was the main reason for why this bill was passed in the first 
place considering they make up the CANF.  D1 also was now able to receive 
remittances as well as funds from the United States government, as mentioned 
previously as long as they were publically opposing the Cuban government then 
they would be supported.  Likewise, E1 and E2 Groups benefited, with the 
exception of the MLC’s they too were supported in their struggle against the Castro 
regime.   
8.1.5 Pope John Paul II visit to Cuba 
In January 1998, Pope John Paul II became the first pontiff to visit Cuba.  
During his visit, he delivered messages of hope, both for believers and non-
believers alike, avocations of peace and transition/change (counter to communism), 
and finally opposition of the embargo by the United States.146  Aside from the 
message opposing the embargo, the Pope’s words were in essence opposing the 
current regime.  Not only did they seek to inspire resistance, they also delivered a 
message or persistence in pushing for change.  
Even though Fidel Castro permitted the Pope’s visit, which provided him 
some favor with the people of Cuba, the costs far outweighed the benefits 
considering his inspirational speeches/message.  Not only were the Cubans 
influenced by the papal visit, the party members themselves were as well.  This fact 
was probably the most worrisome of all and was the reason behind the 
“depopification campaign,” which had a goal of reducing the impact of the Pope’s 
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message.  During this period, “the regime blocked all other messages, while 
focusing their own propaganda.”147 
That being said, Group A1 and A2 not only suffered from this 
encouragement by the Pope, but also with self-confliction, considering the fact that 
Catholicism is the most practiced religion on the island.148  Groups B1 and B2 were 
also negatively impacted by the papal visit in terms of their support for the current 
regime.  This event really forced these groups to, at the very least, consider a 
different economic and governmental ideology, one more in line with their 
religious beliefs.  Furthermore, they both helped create and participate in the 
political “depopification campaign” in order to attempt to reinforce the communist 
ideology,149 only compounding the disagreement in their belief systems.    
Group C1 benefited from these messages of hope and peace, helping to 
encouraging them to keep struggling and stay optimistic.  They also were able to 
reaffirmed their religious beliefs, considering that this was the first visit of any 
pontiff by the Catholic church.  Groups D1 and D2 also benefited for this very 
reason, but also through the messages of resistance.  This visit helped them to keep 
their crusade for change alive, and internationally highlighted their struggle against 
the communist regime.  The same can be said regarding Groups E1 and E2, with the 
addition of the request for clemency by the Pope himself regarding the opponents 
of the regime who had been imprisoned.   
8.1.6 The Rise of Hugo Chavez and Venezuela 
When leftist President Hugo Chavez first took office in 1999, he almost 
immediately took to “socializing” Venezuela.  Through his “Plan Bolivar” he halted 
the planned privatization of both the petroleum and aluminum industries, 
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furthermore he used the military to feed and give care to the poor of Venezuela.150  
He also aligned himself with Fidel Castro, and the Cuban “revolucion,” encouraging 
trade between the countries and providing Cuba with petroleum below the market 
cost. 
This foreign event was extremely beneficial to both Groups A1 and B1, as it 
helped in alleviating the energy problems that were facing Cuba at the time.  
Moreover, his leftist policies and tremendous support from the Venezuelan masses 
(a majority of which are impoverished) helped A1 and B1 Groups confidence in 
dealing with the people by providing a fellow brother in arms if you will, as well as 
an example of how the current regimes policies were being to some extent adopted 
by another Latin American country.  However, the alleviation of the energy 
problems was still the dominant positive influence on these groups. 
The indifferent Groups C1 and C2 were not really affected one way or 
another by the addition of this new ally.  Even though Cuba’s energy needs were 
taken care of the majority of people in this group do not depend as much on 
petroleum and instead rely more on human and animal labor to fulfill the 
requirements for agricultural production.  The D1 and E1 Groups also did not 
benefit from this new Chavez support for this very reason, and in fact were 
pursued even harder by the Cuban government due to the addition of resources 
that were previously dedicated to energy production.151 
8.1.7 9/11 and the United States Counter Terrorism Campaign 
After September 11th 2001, the United Sates began a crackdown on so called 
“terrorist regimes” by invading Afghanistan and then later Iraq.  In addition to 
these military operations, significant changes were made to the United States 
security and international policies.  These changes increased security funding and 
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even introduced the Department of Homeland Security, who  now coordinate with 
Immigration and Naturalization Services, or INS to combat illegal immigration.   
These events actually positively affected Groups A1, A2, and some of B1 and 
B2 in that the DHS and INS organizations helped prevent Cuban dissidents from 
reaching the United States, allowing the regime to appropriately deal with the 
revolting Cubans.  In some ways it actually added to their power and control over 
the population.  It negatively affected some of the B1 and B2 Groups in that they 
were added to watch lists, and in some cases even expelled from the United 
States.152 
Groups C1 and D1 suffered similar fates, the increased border security by the 
United States made it much harder to escape, and if they were caught, guaranteed 
them prison sentences.153  However, D1 and D2 were both aided by United States 
governments policy to pursue terrorists or anyone harboring or assisting terrorists 
in anyway.  To some extent, this policy furnished the CANF and other Cuban 
liberation groups with more swaying power in terms of the United States 
government.  This was due in part to the suspected links between Cuba and FARC 
or Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.154  Group E1 and E2 however, do not 
enjoy these benefits, partially because of some of the group’s links, namely, CANF 
to terrorist activity.155 
8.1.8 European Union’s Reaction to Treatment of Dissidents in Cuba  
The European Union’s international relations have consistently tried to 
encourage human rights and basic freedoms when dealing with non-democratic 
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regimes.  In terms of the EU’s view, Cuba has committed many unjustifiable acts 
against humanity in terms of its treatment of dissidents.  This especially came to 
light in 2003 when Cuba executed by firing squad three dissidents who attempted 
to hijack a ferry and flee to the United States, and imprisoned 75 others for their 
political beliefs.156 Not only was this action condemned by the EU member states, a 
resolution was also passed effectively stopping “the procedure to consider the 
admission of Cuba into the Africa-Pacific-Caribbean (ACP) Cotonou Agreement.”157 
This erosion of relations between the EU and Cuba not only set international affairs 
back, but also eliminated Cuba’s possibilities of accessing tariff free markets as well 
as receiving financial aid from a pool of approximately 13 billion dollars.158 
The consequences of this event were extremely negative in terms of the A1, 
A2, and B1, B2 Groups.  Not only were they denied access to potential revenues 
through trade, they also took a step backwards in the process of international 
relations with the European Union. Both of these factors when combined with the 
removal of aid packages proved to be quite negative for the economy of Cuba.  
Additionally, the so-called negative press regarding the capital punishment of 
dissidents only increased support for their opposition. 
This increase in international support for the opposition helped to fuel 
groups D1, D2 and E1, E2 strengths.  In addition to the current United States 
position regarding the Castro regime, the EU’s reaction towards Cuban repression 
provided a second platform for the resistance.  This also increased their willingness 
to stand up against the regime, in that they know the media will cover their cases 
and sentences.   
                                               
156 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/castro/timeline/timeline2.html  
157 Brenner and Roy (2008) p. 254 
158 Betancourt (2004) p. 23 
 74 
8.1.9 The Emergence of a Democratically Elected Left in Latin America 
The addition of other leftist leaders throughout several Latin American 
countries is further improving Cuban economic and governmental reach and scope.  
As previously noted, the affects of Hugo Chavez’s rise to power in Venezuela were 
very positive for the Cuban regime, most notably in the energy sector of the 
economy.  Now with the addition of Evo Morales the president of Bolivia, Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina, Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay, Fernando Lugo 
of Paraguay, Michelle Bachelet of Chile, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva of Brazil, Latin America is heading towards a majority of leftist 
political views.  This is obviously beneficial to Cuba in that it is more in line with its 
ideology, even considering the democratic process of electing the presidents. 
Both Groups A1, A2 and B1, B2 are strengthened by the addition of the new 
Latin American trading partners.  Not only does this provide more potential 
income to Cuba, it also gives the current Cuban regime some added credibility, 
both foreign and domestically speaking.  These new revenues and trading partners 
also benefit C1 in terms of the increase in products available to them as well as 
larger markets with which work.  The swing towards a leftist majority in South 
America, and to some extent opposition of the United States helps to provide the 
Cuban regime more international support and leverage against the trade embargo. 
This move towards leftism and support of the Castro regime by other Latin 
American countries is a strong setback to both Groups D1, D2 and E1, E2.  
Specifically, the D2 and E2 Groups are left with fewer allies in terms of their 
campaign for change.  Not only are their positions weakened by this, but also their 
opponents and the Cuban government is greatly strengthened by it. 
8.2 Total Affect of Foreign/International Events on the Population Groups 
All of these key foreign/international events had a significant influence on 
the different Cuban population groups.  However, according to the analysis, also 
depicted in the chart above, there seems to be a slight advantage of the C, D, and E 
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Groups.  Internationally speaking, transition seems to be favored by most if not all 
nations, with the exception of a few Latin American leftist countries, most notably 
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.  Even with the support of these key South 
American countries, population Groups A and B still seem to be at a disadvantage 
in terms of support of their ideology.  Additionally, several of these events have 
given the opponents living in Cuba the courage, to openly criticize the Castro 
regime, regardless of the consequences. The opponents of the current regime 
currently living outside of Cuba also have an advantage in terms of international 
public support for transition and change. 
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9. Affects of Domestic Events on the Population Groups 
 Similar to the analysis regarding the foreign events and there impacts on the 
different population groups, an analysis must now be done on the domestic events 
and how they influence Cuban sentiment in terms of favoring or disfavoring 
transition and change.  Considering the limited media available to the public, as 
well as the secretive nature of the Cuban government, an examination of domestic 
events and their affects on the feelings of the people are a natural progression in the 
research process.  As stated earlier, the information available regarding domestic 
events is rather subjective and difficult to substantiate, therefore a combination of 
sources were used in order to develop the most likely scenario in terms of the 
Cuban population groups.  The following analysis of the most influential domestic 
events can be seen in the illustration below.   
Chart 9 
 
9.1.1 Cuba’s Economic Crisis in the Early 1990’s 
 Brought on primarily by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic crisis 
faced by Cuba in the early 1990’s was severe, forcing the regime to face food 
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shortages, fuel shortages, and a collapse of its primary industries, namely 
agriculture (specifically sugar) and mineral mining.159  Furthermore, the regime’s 
stability was considerably shaken as the fall of the communist empire in Europe 
created internal doubts of whether or not the “revolucion” could survive.160  Even 
almost 20 years later, the Cuban economy has yet to reach its previous levels of 
GDP, only achieving 42.5 percent of its Soviet Union era GDP in 2004.161 
 Obviously, this economic crisis weakened the establishment; even the 
higher-level party members felt the economic pain.  Cuban population Groups A1, 
A2 and B1, B2 suffered the most in terms of public support of their views. 
Moreover, the resulting lowered confidence rate boosted the opposition’s position 
against the Castro regime.  This economic crisis made it clear to the public that 
changes are needed and forces the Cuban government to take responsive actions to 
prevent the crisis from deteriorating even further.162   
 Considering the ramifications of this crisis in terms of public sentiment 
towards the Castro regime, population Groups D1, D2 and E1, E2 grew in their 
domestic as well as international support.  This gain outweighs the hardships that 
were faced by these groups, who where most affected by this economic crisis.  
Group C1 was also positively affected by this domestic event in that the media 
illuminated their plight at the time.163   
 This economic crisis was one of the main causes for the two following 
domestic events, the rise of dissidence, and the resulting economic reforms, which 
both had far-reaching influences on the Cuban population group’s sentiments 
towards the regime as well as the political climate within Cuba itself. 
                                               
159 Carmelo Mesa-Lago (2000) p. 289 
160 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Cuba  
161 Ibid 
162 Carmelo Mesa-Lago (2000) p. 264 
163 http://www.iht.com/articles/1991/09/26/liz_.php  
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9.1.2 The Emergence of a Large Cuban Dissident Movement 
 Throughout the Castro regime there have been several distinct dissident 
movements, some even including mass exoduses of Cubans trying to reach the 
United States at any cost, others more open opposition to the establishment, and 
finally actual upheaval and rebellion.164  As previously discussed all of these 
historical events helped to shape the way Cuba is today.  Governmental policies 
and reactions were empirically based, usually responding with force to any 
opposition.165  However, the early 1990’s dissident movement is different from the 
previous one for several reasons.  Not only has the Soviet Union collapsed, a 
destructive piece of evidence against Castro ideology, but the economy of Cuba lay 
in ruin.  As a result of central planning methods and heavy reliance on the Soviet 
Union, Cuba’s economy was severely crippled, as mentioned previously in the 
economic analysis.  This led to a major depression in which food rationing, and 
even starvation took place.166  This dissident movement was different in that it was 
based primarily on survival, there simply was not enough resources available to 
feed the Cuban people.167 
 This domestic strife significantly reduced the power of the Castro regime.  
Moreover, the fact that violence was used to silence the resistance only enflamed 
the hostility towards the regime.  This dissident movement negatively affected 
Groups A1, A2, and B1, B2, and provided more reason for the C1 Group to migrate 
further towards the D1 and even E1 Groups.  Conversely, this violent response by 
the government ironically drove more Cubans further down the line in terms of the 
opposition groups, D1 and E1.  Thus triggering a snowball effect of dissidence and 
civic upheaval.  As mentioned earlier, this forced the Castro regime to implement 
                                               
164 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CEoDD1F38F936A25752C1A966958260 Costa Rican President 
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Restano and his residence and resulting imprisonment 
166 Cardoso and Helwege (1992) p. 80 
167 http://www.fiu.edu/~fcf/carnavalcincodeagosto.html “El Maleconazo” Uprising  
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economic and policy changes towards the masses.  As evident by the chart above 
these events were devastating in terms of the erosion of power. 
9.1.3 Cuban Economic Reforms 
 After mounting discontent in the 1990’s, the Castro regime was forced to 
implement market orientated reforms in order to soothe the economic woes.  This 
was the “seventh shift in economic organization and fourth in development 
strategy …the ideological pendulum has moved farther to the market than ever 
before.”168  This significant swing in policy is considered by some to be the end of 
the “revolution” and perhaps even socialism.  The introduction of ownership, self-
employment, changes in economic planning, financing, and finally a development 
strategy all are acknowledgments of failure in the current policy.169  The 
introduction of tourism as a mainstay of the Cuban economy also occurred during 
this time.  Since the sugar and mining industries had virtually collapsed tourism 
was a natural resource that had not yet been fully utilized. 
 As mentioned earlier, these political and governmental changes were all 
done in response to the turmoil and upheaval that was growing rapidly.  This was 
an obvious victory for proponents of transition and change within the Cuban 
population.  Groups A1, A2 and B1, B2 both had to relinquish a portion of their 
power to the opposition, benefiting the D1, D2, and E1, E2 Groups.  Furthermore, 
these changes were considered goals met for some Cuban resistance groups.  As 
mentioned in the foreign events analysis, during this time the CANF was pushing 
the United States to tighten the screws, in order to extinguish the Castro Regime. 
 Cuban population Group C1 also benefited from these changes.  Now 
ownership, and self employment were allowed, providing many more 
opportunities and resources.  The changes in development strategy and planning 
benefited the Cubans in this group, who to some extent were able to experience 
                                               
168 Carmelo Mesa-Lago (2000) p. 289 
169 Ibid p. 310 
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mild forms of foreign direct investment and international trade.  All of these 
political changes were aimed at increasing the overall welfare of the Cuban 
population, and since the majority of them can be classified as in the C Group, they 
were the most positively influence by this domestic event. 
9.1.4 1993 Dollarization  
 Related to these reforms, the introduction and acceptance of dollars within 
the Cuban economy also significantly changed the overall sentiment towards the 
regime among the Cuban population.  Considering the vast affects of this domestic 
event, it is necessary examine the affects it had on the Cuban population groups.  
The allowance of dollars and a fixed exchange rate of 25 Cuban pesos to 1 dollar 
created a major change within Cuban society.  In combination with the introduction 
of tourism, as well as the United States allowance of remittances to Cuba, this 
dollarization event significantly shifted power down from party officials to average 
Cubans.170  Moreover, it placed more financial power in the hands of Cubans who 
had family members or friends living outside of Cuba, which included a majority of 
opponents to the regime.   
 Considering the consequences of this radical move, the large shifting of 
power downwards in terms of the Cuban population model illustrated previously 
becomes evident.  Not only have Groups A1, A2 and B1, B2 succumb to what 
amounts to be another political setback in the “revolucion,” they have also allowed 
for funding of the opposition within Cuban borders.  This change helped the 
indifferent groups of people, or C1 and C2, allowing them to send and receive 
dollars from friends and family abroad.  Dollars from tourists or as payment for 
work preferred, provides the groups members with a much needed increase in 
earnings.   
 One issue that is important to consider regarding the topic of Dollarization is 
the fact that some of the opposition members were now receiving more money than 
                                               
170 Archibald R. and M. Ritter (2004) p. 52 
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the actual party members were being paid.  Considering the high exchange rate 
from dollars to pesos, this issue became a focus of the regime, who through various 
methods tried to prevent this from occurring.171   
 Just as an update to this domestic event, Cuba announced the ban of the use 
of dollars in 2004.  The regime goes on to state that the Cuban people who are 
receiving remittances from abroad should now request foreign currencies 
instead.172  This in reality does not have much effect on what is already happening.  
Not only is this policy change a symbolic form of resistance against the United 
States, but it is in reality useless as long as currency exchange markets freely exist.   
9.1.5 “La Patria es de Todos” or “The Homeland Belongs to Us All” 
 The blatant and public opposition of the Castro regime by Vladimiro Roca, 
Felix Bonne, Rene Gomez, and Marta Beatriz Roque and their authoring of “La 
Patria es de Todos” and their resulting imprisonment without trial until 2002 is a 
domestic event that both shocked and motivated the Cuban opposition within and 
outside of Cuba.173  This document represented the Cuban oppositions views and 
“response to the comments of the party to the program for the fifth party congress 
…strongly criticizing the lack of freedoms and the fact that under the pretext of 
maintaining unity important decisions were taken without consulting the 
citizens.”174  This domestic event was the first time a truly analytical document was 
challenging specific ideological points regarding the Castro regime and was putting 
forth several potential transitions that might help homogenize government policy 
and actions.175   
                                               
171 Betancourt (2004) p. 30 
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 Again, this very public opposition to the establishment was another setback 
in terms of the powers of both the A1, A2 and B1, B2 population groups.  
Additionally, the Cuban government’s response to this non-violent act of defiance, 
or imprisonment without a trail for five years was another blow to the Cuban 
regime in terms of further pushing people towards the opposition. In terms of the 
C1 and C2 Group this did exactly that, drawing them closer to a position of 
opposition. 
 Groups D1, D2 and E1, E2 on the other hand were strengthened by this open 
act of defiance.  Furthermore, the international media that reported this event 
helped to highlight the classic struggle of oppression and resistance further.176  
Aside from the members that were imprisoned, the overall affect was significantly 
positive. 
9.1.6 “Proyecto Varela” Proposal of Democratic Changes to the Cuban Policy 
 The “Proyecto Varela” was a proposed law promoting democratic changes to 
the Cuban governmental policies.  Oswaldo Paya, a member of the CLM or Group 
D1 headed the project which collected over 11,200 signatures of  Cuban citizens 
with their identification numbers.  The proposal included changes ranging from 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press to freedom to start private 
businesses.177  The controversial project relied on a loophole within the Cuban 
constitution, which allows citizens to propose laws if over 10,000 citizens signed 
them.  Because of this proposal’s oppositional nature, it created quite a controversy 
in Cubans at home and abroad.  In response to this proposal, the Cuban 
government created a counterproposal basically closing the loophole that the 
Proyecto Varela relied on with a supposed 99 percent approval rating among 
                                               
176 News Article highlighting their plight http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/297278.stm  
177 Founder of the Varela Project:  http://www.oswaldopaya.org/es/varela-project/ and 
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Cubans.178  In addition to this, they also imprisoned several members of the project 
with some sentences ranging from a few months to over 25 years. 
 Again this act of public defiance further eroded the power of Groups A1, A2 
and B1, B2.  Proyecto Varela drew a response that in essence not only closed the 
constitutional loophole, but also assured socialist ideology perseverance.   The 
imprisonment of the Cuban dissidents who participated in the project also drew 
international outrage, further corroding the credibility of the regime.   
 Groups D1, D2 and E1, E2 were further helped by this project of resistance.  
The government’s reaction only increased the impact this had on the Cuban 
populations groups, forcing them to resort to “crackdown” tactics, which included 
imprisonment.  The international media also helped to raise awareness regarding 
the CLM, and Oswaldo Paya cause of peaceful political change. 
9.1.7 The Elian Gonzalez Event 
 The famous custody battle between the Cuban American family and the 
Cuban father of a young boy whose mother had died trying to take him to the 
United States was an incredibly influential event.  The tragic story of Elian 
Gonzalez who had survived, but had lost his mother attempting to escape from 
Cuba, was a rallying point for the Cuban Regime as well as its opponents both 
domestic and foreign.  The highly publicized (both in the United States as well as in 
Cuba) stand-off and ensuing custody battle between Elian’s father and his Cuban 
American relatives in Miami was used as a propaganda tool by both the regime as 
well as the Castro opponents, specifically the CANF.179  The outcome, or return of 
Elian to Cuba, was considered a success for the Cuban regime.  Furthermore, the 
consequent propaganda surrounding the event was very effectively employed by 
Castro and his regime and helped to revive ideological values held by the 
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government.  This event had a distinct flavor of “David and Goliath,” and helped to 
boost the sense of pride and nationalism within Cuba. 
 This event was an obvious win for the A1, A2 and B1, B2 Groups.  It 
exemplified that, especially through the continued propaganda, Elian preferred to 
live in Cuba’s socialist system rather than in the United States capitalist democracy.  
The A1 and A2 Groups used this domestic event as a rallying point to encourage 
other Cubans patriotism and sense of national pride in the Castro regime.  The B1 
and B2 Groups were only too happy to display their support and loyalty to the 
party.  Group C1 was only affected in terms of their migration towards support of 
the party. 
 On the contrary, the opposition, especially foreign, D2 and E2 suffered a 
significant defeat.  Worse still was the fact that this was an extremely public loss 
drawing the attention of media from around the world.     
9.1.8 Crackdown and Detention of 75 and Execution of 3 Cubans in 2003 
 On March 18th 2003, the day before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Cuban 
government arrested “80 people for their political beliefs.  The government also 
searches homes, seizing personal papers and electronic equipment …75 are tried 
and convicted on treason charges.  Denied lawyers before the start of the trial, the 
defendants are tried in courtrooms closed to all but immediate family members.  
Foreign diplomats and reporters are barred from the proceedings.  The sentences 
range from six to 28 years in prison and average over 19 years.”180  This domestic 
event not only demonstrated blatant disregard for human rights, but also was an 
unsuccessful attempt at hiding the crackdown on dissidents behind the looming 
United States war/invasion of Iraq.  As discussed previously in the 
foreign/international events and their influences on the Cuban population, this 
event caused the breakdown of talks concerning the EU and Cuban agreement to 
join the Africa-Pacific-Caribbean (ACP) Cotonou Agreement. 
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 This crackdown was Castro’s regime’s attempt to further rid and publically 
discourage dissidence in Cuba.  Not only was this unsuccessful in terms of 
reducing the opposition, it also financially injured the Cuban economy as well as 
further reduced credibility of the regime.  Groups A1, A2 and B1, B2 might have rid 
themselves of some opponents for however long their prison sentences happened 
to be, but in return increased the credibility of their opposition.  Group C1 was 
partially affected by this in that it may have pushed some of their members to move 
more towards D1, but was also harmed by the resulting loss of trade and aid from 
the EU and the Cotonou Agreement. 
 Other than the members arrested, groups D1 and E1 were strengthened by 
this event.  The resulting migration from C1 in combination with the international 
media and the breakdown of talks between the EU and Cuba regarding the 
Cotonou Agreement further increased their standing with the international 
community. 
9.2 Total Affect of Domestic Events on the Population Groups 
 All of these domestic events that took place helped to shape the sentiments 
of the Cuban people in terms of their views towards the Castro regime.  As 
illustrated by the graph above, there is an overlying trend of the degradation of 
support for the current establishment, particularly in terms of its tactics on dealing 
with dissidents and credibility.  With the exception of the Elian Gonzalez case, the 
Castro regime has only really lost public support and sentiment in the key domestic 
events.  Although some of the research and publications are biased, the reduction of 
Cuban sentiment towards the Castro regime still seems to hold true.   
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10. Potential Transitional Changes within Cuba Considering Public 
Sentiment  
10.1 Introduction and Overview of Stakeholders’ Sentiments towards Change 
 Before introducing the potential transitions that might take place within 
Cuba considering the stakeholders’ different sentiments towards change, it is 
important to first mention the difficulty in analyzing the sometimes-biased 
information.  As mentioned previously this examination of events both foreign and 
domestic, was based on a wide array of information and sources.  A goal of 
objectivity was paramount throughout the paper.  That being said, the following 
summation of Cuban and non-Cuban stakeholder sentiments in terms of their 
support for or opposition to the socialist/communist Castro regime is a personal 
view of how the stakeholders are expected to react based on all the research 
conducted.   
 Based on the previous analyses of the foreign and domestic events and their 
influence on the Cuban people themselves, a trend of opposition and resistance can 
be found.  Granted given that the size of the population Groups in A and B will not 
likely change, at least in the short-term or while the Castro regime remains in 
power, there still seems to be a migration of Cubans into the C Groups as well as 
towards the D and E Groups.  As evident by the very first chart describing the 
makeup of the different population groups, the slightly skewed bell curve on the 
right side of chart one, reflects this migration.  Additionally, the consistently 
growing exodus from Cuba to the United States seems to reflect these findings.181  
Furthermore, the research of Churchill Roberts, Ernesto Betancourt, Guilermo 
Grenier, and Richard Scheaffer for the United States Agency for International 
Development measuring Cuban public opinion also seems to indicate that there are 
a growing number of dissatisfied and disillusioned Cubans.  In terms of the Cuban 
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American sentiments, the strength of the CANF seems to also exemplify their 
strong opposition towards the Castro regime.  
 In terms of foreign stakeholders in Cuba, namely foreign countries, there 
seems to be some change from the traditional historic positions held in relation to 
the perception of the Castro regime.  As mentioned earlier, with the leftist 
progression of governments in Latin America, there appears to be added support 
for Cuba and the “revolucion.” This is most notable in Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador with the election of Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa 
specifically.  In terms of the other Latin countries, their leftist views are not as 
extreme and therefore would not influence a change as these three countries would.  
The United States, of course with its historical presence and even control of Cuba, 
seems to be consistent with its previous policies towards the Castro regime.  The 
other main country stakeholders, Canada, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands also 
appear to be in agreement with their previous positions on the Castro regime.  The 
two countries’ stakeholders that also must be considered due to their impact on 
Cuba currently and historically are Russia and China. 
 For the purposes of this paper, the polar positions of the United States and 
Venezuela will be used during the following analysis regarding the potential 
transitional changes within Cuba.  This is done in order to simplify the actual 
research results and provide for a more easily understood description of 
transitional elements within Cuba.  Furthermore, the industrial stakeholders will 
also be excluded from the analysis.  This is done not only because of the lack of 
information but also because it would be extremely difficult to separate their 
influences from those of the foreign governments.  Moreover, the government’s 
responses as well as actions would to some extent be the result of, or at least 
influenced by, the different industries lobbying power within their home countries.  
 Therefore, the following potential transitional changes will be analyzed by 
the breakdown of the Cuban population groups, or the largest most important 
stakeholder.  This will be followed by the breakdown of the foreign countries (The 
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United States and Venezuela), as the second largest stakeholder groups.  An 
examination of the most likely transitional changes will be cross referenced with the 
way the stakeholders might react, providing an image of the political climate in 
each case.  This analysis keeps the stakeholder sentiments in mind in order to 
achieve a more realistic result. 
 The first most obvious potential transitional change would be the extension 
of the Castro regime, or no real change at all.  This would mean a successor would 
take the place of Fidel/Raul Castro.  Similarly, a peaceful transition could also 
occur whereby the people put a new government into place.  The next potential 
change could be the result of a coup, which could result in either another 
dictatorship succession (not chosen by the current regime), or an actual transition 
(peacefully or violently/civil war).  Somewhat related to this change in power is the 
potential for a United States intervention.  Just as there could be U.S. intervention, 
there could also be Venezuelan intervention, or both.  However, it is rather unlikely 
for an international intervention to take place without a catalyst. 
 In all these cases, four basic transitional changes can take place, the first 
being no change, or a progression to another dictator.  The next being an update in 
the communistic/socialistic policies similar to China’s version of communism.  This 
could also occur under a new dictatorship but for this analytical process the two 
will remain separate.  Thirdly, a transition to a socialistic democracy could occur.  
This would in some respects be similar to the Norwegian economic and 
governmental structure.  However, judging from Cuba’s history it would be 
expected to be more socialistic in its nature.  Finally, the fourth potential Cuban 
transition is the change to a free-open market economy with a democratically 
elected government, similar to that of the United States.   
 Both the methods as well as the transitional changes themselves are 
illustrated in charts four and five below.  The time scale as well as cost scale on the 
methods chart, as well as the different axes on the matrix chart are especially 
noteworthy. 
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11.  Methods, Changes, and Stakeholders Views Towards Them 
11.1.1 Succession 
It is important to mention, no changes will likely take place until the deaths 
of both Fidel and Raul Castro.  That being said, the most calm and to some extent 
stable transition will be that of succession.  In this change, there would most likely 
be no economic and governmental change aside from the new dictator.  This change 
would be the first choice for both the A1, A2, and B1, B2 Cuban population Groups.  
It would also be favored by the leftist Latin American countries.  This change 
would not however, be favored by the D1, D2 and E1, E2 Groups.  Neither the 
United Sates nor the EU would like this scenario.  Considering the current Cuban 
sentiment towards the Castro regime, this change could be potentially dangerous 
for slipping down the line to a coup or even civil war.  In fact, if this were to be the 
future change for the Cuban government, it would only be a matter of time before it 
did slide down the line.  A transition to a “Chinese” style of communism might 
however be a viable option in this case.  Not only would it help to significantly 
boost the economy by introducing more capitalistic policies, it might also be 
considered as the change big enough to cause the lifting of the United States 
embargo.  In the case of the other scenarios, coup and civil war, especially violent 
ones, the United Sates would most likely intervene.  Complicating this is the fact 
that the Venezuelan military might also try to intervene creating somewhat of a 
power struggle.  If this struggle was to occur, the UN and NATO would most likely 
come in to the equation.    
11.1.2 Peaceful Transition 
The best possible scenario would be a peaceful transition.  In this case, the 
regime would peacefully relinquish control, and a democratically elected 
government would take over.  If this were to happen, an open market economy or a 
socialistic economy would be the most probable outcomes.  However, considering 
Cuba’s history and communistic/socialistic past, a socialistic economy would most 
likely be selected within the new democracy.  This change would still involve the 
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United States due to its historical precedence over Cuba and large Cuban refugee 
population.  Considering the recent trends in international relations, specifically in 
terms of the leftist Latin American governments response to the United Sates and 
vice versa,182 Venezeula would most likely participate in this transition as well.  As 
long as democratic freedoms are in place, this might not be too bad.  However, if 
foul play arises then the situation will get much more complicated.  It would be too 
speculative to comment on what might occur if that happened. 
This transition would be favored by the D1, D2, and E1, E2 Cuban 
population Groups.  Considering the fact that this transition’s most likely outcome 
would be a free and open market economy, along with a democratically elected 
government, this seems to be favored by not only the dissidents in the United Sates 
but also the Cubans at home.183  The A1, A2 and B1, B2 Groups would find it 
difficult to accept defeat, and would probably encourage at a very minimum more 
socialistic economic reforms. 
11.1.3 A Coup 
If a coup were to take place, the key factor would probably be violence.  If 
there were violence, not only would the recovery and stability take much longer to 
achieve, but the international community would also intervene.  Again considering 
the historical precedence along with the significant population of Cuban refugees 
the United Sates would be expected to intervene.  In this scenario, a lot would 
depend on the coup leader, and what type of economic and governmental system 
he or she might put in place.  If this system was to be an even tighter dictatorship, 
than it would only be a matter of time before this too was changed.  But if, on the 
other hand, it adopted the Chinese version of communism, or even a more 
socialistic version of a democracy their might be a chance.   
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This scenario would most likely result in the rise to power of the Cuban 
population Group B1 or B2.  A coup leader would not be from population Group A 
for the simple fact that they are already in control.  If this did occur from an A 
Group member, then it would be an obvious internal power struggle.  This scenario 
might also happen if E or D were able to organize together and form a united front.  
Otherwise, they would not stand a good chance of succeeding, without foreign 
backing.  In either scenario, the leader who was able to convince the C Group, who 
has the largest population, to back them would have a significant advantage.    
11.1.4 Civil War 
This scenario is the worst of all.  This transition would take the longest to 
achieve stability and would cost the most in terms of resources and probably lives.  
Intervention would be virtually guaranteed not only by the United States, but also 
by Venezuela and even the UN and NATO.  None of the Cuban population groups 
would favor this transition, with the potential exception of the E Group.  
Considering the E Group’s radical views, they might be willing to accept the 
consequences of a civil war if that was the way they could achieve their goals.  This 
transition could include any of the potential economic and governmental changes.  
This would all depend on how the civil war plays out, and which and to what 
extent do the foreign countries intervene.   
11.2 Overall Cuban Sentiments toward Transition/System 
As stated earlier, it is difficult to gauge Cuban sentiments, especially towards 
the Castro and the communistic regime.  That being said, considering the growing 
numbers of dissidents/refugees in the United States the answer seems to be an 
overwhelming opposition to the existing Cuban regime.  Furthermore, their 
position towards democracy and an open free market economy seems to be 
favorable.  Based on the information and culmination of research, as well as 
domestic acts of resistance (within Cuba), in particular, “La Patria es de Todos” and 
the Proyecto Varela, open free market economic policies and a democratically elected 
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government does seem to be the desired outcome of any transition by the Cuban 
people. 
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12. Transitioning to a Market Economy:  Critical Areas of Focus 
12.1 Previous Transitional Issues in Other Countries 
Before describing the critical areas of focus when transitioning to a market 
economy, it is important to first consider the previous transitions of other 
sometimes-similar countries.  The examination of the transitions in China and the 
USSR for example, are great resources for developing a plan of action and timeline 
for transition.  Cuba’s transitional issues will be similar to those of the former Soviet 
Union and other Communist bloc nations.  The transitions of “one price systems – 
the distorted price system that prevailed under communism – to a market price 
system,” “the creation of markets and institutional infrastructure that underlies it,” 
and the “privatization of property which had previously belonged to the state” are 
all significant challenges that these nations confronted when moving towards open 
free market economies.184  As Joseph Stiglitz describes, the creation of a “new kind 
of entrepreneurship… and new enterprises to help redeploy the resources that had 
previously been so inefficiently used” is something that not only the government 
has to facilitate, but also the actual population must learn or understand in order 
for these transitions to take place.  This issue in particular is much easier said than 
done, considering the previous regimes ideologies, and their stance against this 
nuance of free open markets.  In particular, the population does not truly 
understand these concepts.    
Another very crucial element in the transitioning process has to do with the 
“speed of reform.”  This issue was highlighted by the fiasco and corruption packed 
transition of the Former Soviet Union, and in particular its privatization of State 
resources.  This “Shock Therapy” endorsed by the United States Treasury and IMF 
was a total disaster and is a great example of how not to transition.185  China’s 
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“gradualist approach” and order in which transitions took place and subsequent 
success is a great example of how to perform governmental transition.  One very 
positive aspect of Cuba and its similarity to China has to do with its tendencies to 
be an agricultural society.  The sugar plantations dominated Cuba’s economy until 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.  This is important because China’s successful 
transition was to some extent due to this very fact.  “It was neither gradualism nor 
experimentation, but rather China’s economic structure, that proved so felicitous to 
reform.  China began reform as a peasant agricultural society, EEFSU (Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union) as a urban and over industrialized … In 
Gershenkron’s famous phrase, China had the advantage of backwardness.”186 
12.2 Cuba’s Critical areas of Focus in the Transition Process 
12.2.1 Preliminary Transitional Elements 
Considering Cuba’s current standings among the international community, 
specifically the United States, a significant amount of work is needed to be done 
regarding the change of this status.  This would not only help to get Cuba grants 
and funds from these countries but would also be the first step in the transitioning 
process.  One of these key changes that must be done is the allowance of 
international observing to take place, or transparency.  This change would 
drastically improve relations with the United States as well as the European Union.  
International agencies and organizations such as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Organization of 
American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN) will also play significant roles 
in the transformation process.  These agencies and organizations will not only help 
to fund the transformation but also help the interim Cuban government to make 
changes, in terms of recommendations in both policy and organization.  
Additionally, the Helms-Burton Act “provides the basis for the US government, 
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through its directors at these agencies to request that planning for assistance to a 
transition government in Cuba.”187 
Cuba must become a member of a number of these agencies before aid and 
other transitional help is given, this is particularly true of OAS and IADB 
membership.  Cuba is technically currently a member of the OAS, but on paper 
alone and does not participate in, or is included in any form of OAS work due to 
the Eigth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1962.188   Joining 
these multi-lateral organizations requires a large amount of bureaucratic work to be 
done, and a considerable amount of time.189  Considering the importance of timing 
in any transformational process, this preliminary work is vital to any future Cuban 
transformation. 
12.2.2 Low-income and Poor Cuban Population 
Considering the fact that this transition process towards democracy and 
open free market economic policies is being made in order to benefit the Cuban 
people, it is important not to forget them in this process, specifically the poor.  “Few 
people doubt that the poor, or particular groups of the poor, are adversely affected 
by certain adjustment measures.”190  That being said, a critical element to a 
successful transition is the inclusion of policies and even organizations/institutions 
whose sole purpose is to safeguard the poor in combination with constant vigilance 
and quick alterations in policy to avoid this pitfall.  Transitional policy makers have 
the  responsibility to deal with not only “whether to adjust, but how to adjust in a 
manner that minimizes the negative impact on poverty, or, even better, that 
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transform plans for alleviating poverty into a strategy for attaining sustainable 
economic growth.”191 
12.2.3 Urgent Need for Cuban Infrastructure  
The state of current Cuban infrastructure is not fully known due to the 
secrecy of the Castro regime, but it is considered dilapidated by international 
standards.192  In order for any transition to be successful, the core economic sectors 
must be maintained and improved.  Moreover, anything related to these key 
economic sectors must focus on the ports, railways, roads, and communication 
networks/systems.  These are just a few of these types of related infrastructures 
improvements needed.  Considering the nature of Cuba’s economic make up, or 
dependence on the sugar and tourism industries, basic infrastructure plays a key 
role.  Improvements in infrastructure are very costly endeavors.  This type of work 
would require the help of the agencies mentioned above, the high costs of such 
works are further increased considering Cuba’s natural resources and location, or 
the fact that it is a relatively small island. 
12.2.4 Monetary System 
Cuba’s transition would undoubtedly affect the monetary system.  Prior to 
2004, United States dollars were allowed, and had a fixed exchange rate of 25 
Cuban pesos to one dollar.  However since then, aside from the Cuban peso, only 
foreign currencies were allowed.  During a transition process, anything that 
facilitates the foreign direct investment and interests of business in Cuba has a 
positive effect.  As such, the adoption of US dollars as the currency in Cuba could 
have a very positive outcome, similar to that of Ecuador.  This change in the 
monetary system could be made temporary until Cuba was able to achieve a 
specific level of GDP, and then the revalued Cuban peso could be re-introduced.   
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12.2.5 Privatization 
In light of the lessons learned in both the former Soviet Union and China, the 
privatization of certain state assets, those who do not affect the security and welfare 
of the Cuban people, could be gradually undertaken.  With the help of both 
international agencies as well as foreign and domestic investors, a re-organization 
of Cuban assets would be very beneficial in terms of increasing efficiency and 
effectiveness thereby increasing overall Cuban wealth.  This aided privatization 
would encourage Cuban entrepreneurs to create businesses within and outside of 
Cuba, further increasing GDP. 
12.2.6 State and Social Changes 
As mentioned before, many changes in State policy would be needed.  This 
process should be done as democratically as possible allowing the Cuban 
population to choose the extent of reforms. Allowing the Cuban people to make 
governmental changes is an enormous social change.  This change might not come 
easy to the people who have been under rule of a communist system for their entire 
lives.  That being said, programs educating the people regarding the new systems 
should be employed to allow them to make knowledgeable decisions regarding 
public and international policies. 
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13. Conclusion 
As outlined in the previous sections, Cuba has experienced a long and 
complicated history of control.  The country was controlled first by the Spanish 
following their discoverey of the island of Cuba.  The United States, who although 
assisted the Cubans in their efforts to win their independence from Spain but 
ultimately sought to impose measures that benefited the US, was the next nation to 
control Cuba.  And lastly, Cuba has been under the rule of a number of dictators, 
the most significant of which was and is Fidel Castro.  Castro has controlled the 
country for the last four and half decades.  His policies have significantly affected 
the country’s relationship with both the United States and the Soviet Union.  The 
US embargo of Cuban goods and services and Cuba’s subsequent reliance on the 
Soviet Union for its economic survival have played a key role on the sentiments of 
the Cuban stakeholders. 
As a result of its complicated history, which contributed significantly to the 
development of its economic sectors and policies, Cuba’s economy remains 
dependent upon a limited number of sectors, the most important of which is its 
sugar industry.  Both the United States and the Soviet Union have contributed to 
Cuba’s dependence on the sugar sector.  For many, the fall of the Soviet Union was 
expected to cause the collapse of the Cuban economy.  However, Castro was able to 
implement reforms that prevented this occurrence.  Nevertheless, for Cuba to 
transition from a communist system to a democracy and to capture the growth 
potential of its various economic sectors, it would require significant investment in 
infrastructure to attract new investment to the Cuban economy. 
 Given the history and the composition of the economy, Cuba’s stakeholders 
have been affected by both international and domestic events.  Further, as has been 
demonstrated in the document, these stakeholders can be divided into a variety of 
groups that range from radically opposing the Castro regime to radically 
supporting it.   With the recent transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother 
Raul, there is much speculation as to the future of Cuba and its transition.  Various 
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scenarios can be envisioned that include everything from civil war to the transition 
to a democratic system.  Each stakeholder group has a different perspective as to 
the likelihood of these possibilities as well as the potential impact on them. 
Based on the analysis, obviously a peaceful transition would be in the 
country’s best interest.  The international community favors a transition to a 
liberalized economy.  However, given the radical stakeholders in Group D2 and E2, 
a coup could occur, especially in light of the recent move to the Left by neighboring 
countries like Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. 
.   
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